Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Mackenson D., a noncitizen, entered the United States on August 12, 2024, at Miami International Airport and was granted humanitarian parole allowing him to remain until June 12, 2025. He applied for asylum on November 11, 2025, which remains pending. On August 27, 2026, U.S. Border Patrol agents arrested him in Florida, and the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings through a Notice to Appear the following day. He was transferred to the California City Immigration Processing Center and has not received a bond hearing in immigration court. On October 2, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the lawfulness of his civil detention and seeking immediate release.
The court outlined the standard of law, recognizing that the Constitution guarantees the writ of habeas corpus to every individual detained within the United States, and that district courts have habeas jurisdiction over challenges to immigration detention. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including noncitizens, and extends to immigration detention proceedings. Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: whether a protected liberty interest exists, and what procedures are necessary to ensure any deprivation of that interest accords with the Constitution.
The Court’s Holding
The court found that Petitioner has a clear liberty interest in his continued freedom protected by the Due Process Clause, which Respondent did not dispute. The court rejected Respondent's argument that Petitioner is an 'applicant for admission' subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), relying on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, which held that § 1225(b)(2) applies only to noncitizens entering at the border, while individuals apprehended in the interior are subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The government's prior decision to release Petitioner on humanitarian parole and allow him to remain in the community for years further strengthened his liberty interest.
Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, the court found all three factors favored Petitioner: (1) Petitioner has a substantial private interest in liberty, underscored by the time he spent at liberty; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable because Petitioner received virtually no procedural safeguards, has no criminal history, has community ties, and Respondent did not argue he is a danger or flight risk; and (3) the government's interest in detaining without process is low, as notice and custody hearings are routine and any burden does not outweigh Petitioner's liberty interest. The court concluded Petitioner was entitled to notice and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker prior to detention, and his detention violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. The court granted the petition, ordered immediate release, and enjoined re-detention under § 1226(a) without at least seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation hearing where the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that detention is justified.
Key Takeaways
- Mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to noncitizens apprehended in the interior of the United States; such individuals are subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
- A noncitizen granted humanitarian parole and allowed to remain in the community for an extended period acquires a strengthened liberty interest protected by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
- Detention without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker violates due process when the detainee has no criminal history, poses no flight risk or danger, and has community ties.
- The government must provide at least seven days' notice and a hearing where it proves by clear and convincing evidence that detention is necessary and no alternative can mitigate the risk.
- The court's injunction bars re-detention under § 1226(a) absent compliance with these constitutional and statutory protections.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the Ninth Circuit's interpretation in Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock that the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2) is limited to arriving noncitizens at the border, not those apprehended in the interior. It affirms that humanitarian parole creates a significant liberty interest that cannot be extinguished without due process. The ruling establishes a clear procedural floor for interior immigration detentions: notice, a hearing before a neutral factfinder, and a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for the government. The immediate release order and injunction against re-detention without these safeguards provide a template for similar habeas challenges in the Eastern District of California and beyond.