Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Antonio Fajardo Sanchez Medardo, a federal immigration detainee held at the California Detention Center, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his detention. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. On October 14, 2026, the magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations, which were served on all parties with notice that objections were due within three days.
On October 16, 2026, Respondents filed objections to the findings and recommendations, relying solely on arguments set forth in their previous briefing. The district court noted that those arguments had already been addressed and rejected by the magistrate judge in this case and by the undersigned district judge in other recent cases involving similar due process challenges to the re-detention of noncitizens previously released on bond or parole.
The Court’s Holding
The district court conducted a de novo review of the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304, and found the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations supported by the record and proper analysis. The court adopted the findings and recommendations in full, granting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court ordered Petitioner's immediate release from custody with the same conditions he was subject to prior to his detention in August 2026, and directed Respondents to return all of Petitioner's documents and possessions upon release.
Critically, the court held that the Due Process Clause requires the government to provide a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter at which the noncitizen's eligibility for bond must be considered before re-detaining a noncitizen who has been previously released on bond or conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). The court cited its prior decisions in Selis Tinoco v. Noem, Labrador-Prato v. Noem, D.L.C. v. Wofford, and Altin v. Chestnut as support for this principle. The order further requires that if the government seeks to re-detain Petitioner in the future, it must provide no less than seven days' notice and hold a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter. The court directed the Clerk to enter judgment for Petitioner and close the case.
Key Takeaways
- The Due Process Clause mandates a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter before the government may re-detain a noncitizen previously released on bond or conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
- Arguments previously rejected by the court in similar re-detention cases do not provide a basis to overturn a magistrate judge's findings and recommendations granting habeas relief.
- The court ordered immediate release with prior conditions restored, return of all documents and possessions, and a three-day compliance filing requirement.
- Any future re-detention requires at least seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter.
- The order expressly does not address detention circumstances if the petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal with proper notice.
Why It Matters
This order reinforces a growing line of decisions in the Eastern District of California establishing that noncitizens previously released on bond or parole possess a protected liberty interest that cannot be extinguished without a pre-deprivation hearing. By adopting the magistrate judge's recommendations and citing four recent precedents (Selis Tinoco, Labrador-Prato, D.L.C., and Altin), the court signals a consistent judicial approach to due process protections in immigration re-detention scenarios. The seven-day notice requirement and mandate for a neutral arbiter provide concrete procedural safeguards that limit the government's ability to summarily re-detain individuals.
The decision leaves open the question of what process is due when a noncitizen becomes subject to an executable final order of removal, explicitly carving out that scenario from the order's scope. This limitation suggests the court's due process analysis is tethered to the specific context of re-detention after discretionary release, rather than extending to all immigration detention contexts. The ruling contributes to an emerging circuit-level split on the procedural protections required for re-detention and may influence pending appeals in the Ninth Circuit.