Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Julian Arias Urrego, a citizen and national of Colombia, entered the United States without inspection in February 2024 and was encountered by Border Patrol near the San Diego sector. He received a Notice to Appear and was released on his own recognizance. His asylum application had been pending since January 13, 2025. The court stated that nothing indicated a criminal history, flight risk, or danger to the community, yet he was later arrested, placed in ICE custody, and detained at the California City Detention Facility.
On September 23, 2026, Urrego petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that his detention violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Respondents answered on October 21, asserting authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The matter had been referred to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302, but the district judge withdrew that reference in the interest of justice and judicial efficiency and decided the petition directly.
The Court’s Holding
Relying on Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 2026 WL 2196424 (9th Cir. July 30, 2026), and citing several earlier Eastern District of California decisions, the court found that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governed Urrego's detention. For the reasons articulated in those authorities, it concluded that his re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing violated the Fifth Amendment. The court therefore granted the habeas petition and ordered that he be released immediately.
The court also enjoined and restrained respondents from re-detaining him unless the government gives at least seven days' advance notice and provides a bond hearing before a neutral arbiter under § 1226(a) and applicable regulations. At that hearing, his bond eligibility must be considered, and the government must show by clear and convincing evidence that flight risk or community danger legally justifies physical custody. A footnote qualifies the relief: if legally sufficient circumstances justify arrest without advance notice, a compliant post-deprivation hearing must occur within seven days. If Urrego receives notice of a final removal order, respondents may detain him solely to execute removal, with a bond hearing within the timeframe required by law. The clerk was directed to close the case and enter judgment for petitioner.
Key Takeaways
- The court applied Rodriguez Vazquez and its cited district decisions to conclude that § 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b)(2)(A), supplied the governing detention framework for this petitioner.
- The constitutional violation was re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing, and the remedy was a granted habeas petition with an order for immediate release.
- Any otherwise permissible re-detention generally requires seven days' advance notice, a neutral-arbiter bond hearing, consideration of bond eligibility, and clear and convincing government evidence of flight risk or dangerousness.
- The order expressly preserves a seven-day post-deprivation-hearing route when legally sufficient circumstances justify arrest without advance notice.
- A noticed final removal order permits detention solely for executing removal, subject to a bond hearing within the legally required timeframe; the order does not adjudicate the pending asylum application.
Why It Matters
This unpublished district order applies cited Ninth Circuit authority to an individual habeas case and specifies the process required before the government may ordinarily re-detain Urrego. Its clear-and-convincing-evidence requirement, neutral-arbiter hearing, advance-notice rule, and express exceptions define the actual scope of relief; they should not be read as a blanket prohibition on every future detention or as a decision on asylum or removal merits.
The withdrawal of the magistrate-judge reference allowed the district judge to resolve the petition directly. Because the clerk was directed to enter judgment for Urrego and close the case, the order is a final disposition of this habeas action rather than a recommendation, an interim screening ruling, or a dismissal permitting amendment.