Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Plaintiff Jordan Martinez filed this action in state court on January 16, 2026, against Lockheed Martin Corporation, Kaitlyn Steigerwald, and Does 1-10, with a first amended complaint filed March 17, 2026. Plaintiff served Lockheed Martin on April 3, 2026, and attempted to serve Steigerwald through Lockheed Martin's designated agent, believing she was employed there. Plaintiff later learned from Lockheed Martin's notice of removal that Steigerwald had relocated to the United Kingdom around March 2026 and, as of May 4, 2026, resided there indefinitely. When plaintiff failed to serve Steigerwald within the 90-day Rule 4(m) deadline, the court ordered plaintiff to show cause why Steigerwald should not be dismissed. Plaintiff's counsel declared she had used internet, social media, and public records to locate Steigerwald's husband in Lincolnshire, England, where he was stationed with the U.S. Air Force, and requested additional time. The court found good cause and granted an extension nunc pro tunc. Less than a week later, plaintiff moved for alternative service under Rule 4(f)(3) or, alternatively, further extension of time.
Lockheed Martin opposed the motion, arguing plaintiff failed to meet and confer and that alternative service was unwarranted. Plaintiff replied, submitting new evidence including a declaration from counsel identifying a photography website (www.kaitsphoto.com) allegedly associated with Steigerwald, with a contact icon leading to an email address. At the motion hearing, counsel acknowledged she did not know what email address the contact icon resolved to because she did not attempt to access it. The court noted plaintiff's reply arguments and evidence were raised for the first time in reply and thus disregarded them.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied plaintiff's motion for alternative service under Rule 4(f)(3). Plaintiff conceded the Hague Convention applies because Steigerwald resides in England, but made no showing that the proposed methods—service via email, social media, or unidentified electronic contact mechanisms—are permissible under the Convention. The court further held that plaintiff's proposed service at unidentified physical addresses or electronic accounts 'associated with' or 'maintained or used' by Steigerwald fails the Due Process Clause requirement that alternative service be 'reasonably calculated' to provide notice. The court disregarded plaintiff's reply arguments and evidence regarding the photography website because they were raised for the first time in reply. Even considering the website, the court found insufficient evidence that the contact icon's email address is reasonably calculated to reach Steigerwald, noting counsel's admission she did not verify the email address and her unsworn assertions about recognizing Steigerwald's photo are not competent evidence.
The court granted plaintiff's alternative request for an extension of time under Rule 4(m), finding limited good cause. Counsel learned of Steigerwald's relocation to England in May 2026 and undertook investigative steps using online and public resources, but did not contact England's Central Authority under the Hague Convention, retain an investigator in England, or attempt to verify the email address from the photography website. The court extended the service deadline to November 19, 2026, but admonished counsel that she will have had more than six months to complete service by that date and further extensions are unlikely absent extraordinary circumstances. The court also admonished the parties regarding meet-and-confer obligations, declining to deny the motion on that ground due to prior communications about service and defense counsel's refusal to consent.
Key Takeaways
- A plaintiff seeking alternative service under Rule 4(f)(3) in a Hague Convention country must show the proposed method is not prohibited by the Convention and is reasonably calculated to provide actual notice.
- Service at unidentified electronic accounts or physical addresses merely 'associated with' a defendant fails due process; the plaintiff must identify a specific, verified method of contact.
- Arguments and evidence raised for the first time in a reply brief are properly disregarded by the court.
- Good cause for a Rule 4(m) extension requires diligent efforts; reliance solely on internet research without pursuing formal Hague Convention channels or verifying contact information may be insufficient for further extensions.
- Counsel's unsworn representations at a hearing do not constitute competent evidence to establish the reliability of a proposed service method.
Why It Matters
This order reinforces the Ninth Circuit's framework from Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink for evaluating Rule 4(f)(3) alternative service requests in Hague Convention countries. The court's refusal to authorize service via an unverified website contact form clarifies that plaintiffs must do more than identify a digital presence 'associated with' a defendant—they must demonstrate the specific method is reasonably calculated to reach the defendant. The decision also illustrates the limits of judicial patience with Rule 4(m) extensions: while the court granted one final extension, it explicitly warned that six months of purely online investigation without engaging the Hague Convention's Central Authority or retaining local assistance is unlikely to justify further delay. Practitioners should note the court's strict approach to reply brief evidence and its insistence on competent, sworn evidence to support alternative service methods.