Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
On July 2, 2026, the court granted the parties' stipulation for a voluntary remand pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and retained jurisdiction over the action until the completion of the remanded administrative proceedings. The plaintiff subsequently filed an unopposed motion on September 30, 2026, seeking $4,703.97 in attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The defendant responded on October 14, 2026, indicating it had given substantive consideration to the request and found no basis to object.
The plaintiff's motion mischaracterized the remand as having been ordered under the fourth sentence of § 405(g) rather than sentence six. Under sentence six, the district court remands the case for further administrative proceedings while retaining jurisdiction, and the claimant does not become a prevailing party eligible for EAJA fees until benefits are awarded on remand and a final judgment is entered. The parties had not sought entry of final judgment, and the record contained no indication that post-remand proceedings were complete or that benefits had been awarded.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the plaintiff's unopposed motion for EAJA fees without prejudice. Relying on Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991), and Ninth Circuit precedent including Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 1995), and Akopyan v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2002), the court held that in sentence six remand cases, the EAJA's thirty-day filing period does not begin until after post-remand proceedings are completed, the Commissioner returns to court, the court enters a final judgment, and the appeal period runs. A sentence six remand does not constitute a final judgment, and a claimant does not become a prevailing party until benefits are awarded on remand.
Because the plaintiff's motion did not address whether she had been awarded benefits on remand or whether post-remand proceedings were complete, and because no final judgment had been entered, the court could not determine whether the fee award was appropriate or timely. The plaintiff may re-file a motion in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and the authorities cited in the order at the appropriate time.
Key Takeaways
- In sentence six Social Security remands, a claimant is not a prevailing party eligible for EAJA fees until benefits are awarded on remand and a final judgment is entered.
- The EAJA's thirty-day application period does not begin to run until post-remand proceedings are complete, a final judgment is entered, and the appeal period expires.
- A sentence six remand order is not a final judgment for EAJA purposes, even if the district court retains jurisdiction.
- An unopposed motion for EAJA fees may still be denied without prejudice if the statutory prerequisites—prevailing party status, final judgment, and timely filing—are not satisfied on the record.
- Plaintiffs must affirmatively demonstrate completion of post-remand proceedings and an award of benefits before seeking EAJA fees in sentence six cases.
Why It Matters
This order reinforces the well-established procedural framework governing EAJA fee applications in Social Security sentence six remand cases. It clarifies that the government's non-opposition does not relieve the court of its obligation to ensure statutory prerequisites are met, particularly the requirement of a final, non-appealable judgment and prevailing party status tied to an actual award of benefits on remand.
The decision serves as a practical reminder to practitioners that premature EAJA motions—even unopposed ones—will be denied without prejudice, and that the fee application clock does not start at the remand order but only after the administrative process on remand concludes with a favorable outcome for the claimant.