Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Martin Alejandro Pinon Garcia, representing himself, petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his ongoing immigration detention at the Central Valley Annex Detention Facility and moved for a temporary restraining order. The order refers to the conditions governing him immediately before his detention in July 2026 but does not recount how he entered the country or was released.
The court relied on Ninth Circuit authority, Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock (9th Cir. 2026), that noncitizens present without admission and apprehended in the interior face discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). It also relied on its own prior orders, including Selis Tinoco, Labrador-Prato, D.L.C., and Altin, requiring a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter before re-detaining someone previously released on bond, conditional parole, or humanitarian parole.
On October 20, 2026, the court asked whether the case differed materially from those orders and whether the parties opposed deciding the petition together with the restraining-order motion. Respondents filed their opposition on October 22, maintaining that § 1225(b) governs and noting Petitioner's significant criminal history. They acknowledged, however, that the case fits the category in which parole matters more than manner of entry, and they did not oppose a ruling directly on the petition.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the habeas petition and the restraining-order motion. Respondents raised no new legal arguments and identified no factual or legal issue distinguishing the case, so the court followed its reasoning in Altin. Criminal history did not change the outcome. Respondents neither argued nor explained why it displaced the prior due process ruling, and the court cited decisions requiring a pre-deprivation hearing despite criminal charges or records where the government offered no argument connecting that history to the detention.
The court treated immediate release as the proper remedy. Petitioner must be released on the conditions in place before his July 2026 detention, without added restrictions such as electronic monitoring unless later found necessary at a hearing. Respondents must return his documents and possessions and file a notice of compliance within three days. The court did not wait for a reply because Petitioner is pro se and delay would defeat the relief. Other pending motions were denied as moot, the order is to be served on the detention facility, and the clerk was directed to enter judgment for Petitioner and close the case.
Re-detention is not barred. The government must give at least seven days' notice and hold a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter who considers bond eligibility, and the court did not decide whether bond should be granted. The order expressly does not address detention if Petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal and receives notice of it. The order's text identifies the restraining-order motion as Doc. No. 3 while its decretal paragraph cites Doc. No. 2; the docket entry confirms the restraining-order motion was granted.
Key Takeaways
- The court held that re-detaining a noncitizen previously released on bond or parole requires a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter.
- Respondents' bare reference to criminal history did not avoid that requirement because they offered no argument connecting it to the court's due process ruling.
- Immediate release, along with return of documents and possessions, was the remedy for detention without the required hearing, rather than merely a future hearing.
- The government may seek re-detention only after at least seven days' notice and a hearing at which bond eligibility is considered.
- The ruling leaves open the government's authority to detain Petitioner under an executable final order of removal.
Why It Matters
This is an unreported district court order, not binding precedent, and it chiefly applies the court's earlier decisions to a case in which Respondents offered no distinguishing argument. Because the court entered judgment and closed the case, the restraining order operates as final relief rather than interim relief pending further proceedings. Its practical effect is limited to Petitioner.
The order shows how this court handles repeat re-detention petitions. It may decide the petition and restraining-order motion together, and a general reference to criminal history will not suffice. Parties in similar cases should expect the court to ask early whether any factual or legal distinction exists from its prior orders. Different records or more developed government arguments could yield different results.