Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Gudrev Singh, who paid the filing fee and is proceeding without a lawyer, sued United States Citizenship and Immigration Services and other defendants in the Eastern District of California. He seeks a writ of mandamus compelling prompt adjudication of his Form I-485 application to adjust status, which he filed on November 18, 2025 after being granted asylum. His complaint, filed May 18, 2026, alleges that no decision had issued by then. The opinion elsewhere refers to a November 19 filing date, a one-day inconsistency that does not affect the analysis.
Defendants moved to dismiss. The court treated the claim as one for unreasonable delay under the Administrative Procedure Act, tested under Rule 12(b)(6). Singh filed a document titled a motion for adjustment of status, which the court construed as an opposition, along with a supplement. He asserts that he faces the loss of his commercial driver's license, cannot operate his financed truck, and must keep making payments without income. Defendants stated that applications are decided in the order received. The case was referred to the magistrate judge under Local Rule 302(c)(21), and this document is a set of findings and recommendations to the district judge, not a final ruling.
The Court’s Holding
Applying the six TRAC factors, the magistrate judge found that most favor defendants. On the first factor, a first-in, first-out queue can be a rule of reason, and an application pending less than a year falls within the range other courts have found acceptable. The court cited decisions finding delays of under four years not unreasonable, and noted one contrary decision involving a five-year delay. The second factor favors Singh because 8 U.S.C. section 1571 expresses Congress's sense that applications be completed within 180 days, and his had been pending about eleven months. The third and fifth factors, addressed together, favor defendants. Delay affects important interests, but the court found Singh had not identified harm beyond that experienced by all applicants facing processing delays. The fourth factor favors defendants because expediting his case would only move him ahead of others in line. The sixth is neutral because he does not allege bad faith.
On balance, the court concluded the factors compel a finding as a matter of law that Singh has not suffered an APA-violating delay. It recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted, the case be dismissed without prejudice, and Singh's motion be denied. The court stressed that this does not mean he can never make the showing, because a delay that is reasonable now may become unreasonable later. It also recommended against leave to amend, finding amendment futile given the defects described.
These are recommendations only. Any party may file objections within twenty-one days of service, and the district judge will make the final decision. Failure to object may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. No judgment has been entered.
Key Takeaways
- The court recommends that a pending adjustment application of about eleven months is not unreasonably delayed as a matter of law under the TRAC factors.
- A first-in, first-out processing queue was treated as a rule of reason, and the fourth factor weighed against queue-jumping relief.
- Exceeding the 180-day benchmark in 8 U.S.C. section 1571 favored the plaintiff on the second factor but did not outweigh the other factors.
- The loss of a commercial driver's license and truck income was treated as the general harm all applicants experience, which did not tip the third and fifth factors.
- Because the recommendation is dismissal without prejudice, the opinion leaves open a later showing that continued delay has become unreasonable, though the court also recommended against leave to amend in this case.
Why It Matters
This recommendation shows how a court in the Eastern District of California may weigh the TRAC factors for a relatively recent adjustment application. It treats the statutory 180-day expectation as a factor that favors the plaintiff but does not control. It also treats individualized financial hardship as insufficient unless it goes beyond what other applicants face.
Its weight is limited. It is a magistrate judge's recommendation in a pro se case, not a final order, and it has not been adopted by the district judge. It also rests largely on district court decisions from other courts, so it has no binding effect on other cases.