Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Rafael Bankston sued Chipotle Services, LLC, and a Doe defendant in the Santa Clara County Superior Court (Case No. 26CV497464). On August 17, 2026, Chipotle removed the case to the Northern District of California, invoking federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. sections 1331, 1441, and 1446. According to the parties' stipulation, removal rested solely on Bankston's Fifth Cause of Action, which alleged a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3). The materials do not describe the other causes of action, and the stipulation indicates removal did not rest on any of them.
On September 9, 2026, Bankston moved to remand, contending that he lacked Article III standing to pursue the Fifth Cause of Action and that the court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The stipulation recites that on September 10 the court struck that motion without prejudice because it did not certify compliance with the meet-and-confer requirement in Section VIII.A of the court's Standing Order for Civil Cases. It further recites that the court directed the parties to confer about a stipulation to withdraw the Fifth Cause of Action, to be followed by a stipulation to remand the remaining claims, citing Washeleski v. City of Campbell. The September order itself was not among the materials reviewed, so its content is taken from the parties' recitals.
Counsel conferred on October 1, 2026, and then filed a joint stipulation dated October 19 asking the court to accept an amended pleading and remand the case.
The Court’s Holding
On October 20, 2026, Judge Eumi K. Lee granted the joint stipulation. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), the First Amended Complaint attached to the stipulation was deemed filed as of the date of the order. That pleading is identical to the prior operative complaint except that it omits the Fifth Cause of Action and any remedies sought solely on that claim, and the order states that the claim is withdrawn.
The court's reasoning was brief. Because Chipotle removed based solely on the Fifth Cause of Action, the withdrawal left an operative pleading presenting no claim over which the court has original jurisdiction. The order concludes that remand of the entire action is therefore required under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), and it remands the case to the Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case No. 26CV497464.
The order does not decide whether Bankston actually has Article III standing on the FCRA theory, does not rule on the merits of any claim, and does not discuss supplemental jurisdiction. It also does not say whether the withdrawal is with or without prejudice. The stipulation provides that each party bears its own attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with the removal and the stipulation, but the order's own text does not separately address fees. The remaining causes of action go forward in state court.
Key Takeaways
- A plaintiff who amends to drop the only claim supporting federal question removal can obtain remand of the whole action under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), as this order illustrates.
- According to the stipulation's recitals, the court steered the parties from a contested remand motion, struck for lack of a meet-and-confer certification, toward a stipulated withdrawal and remand.
- The order resolves only the forum. The Article III standing question the plaintiff raised was not decided, and the remaining claims were not adjudicated on the merits.
- The stipulation allocates the fees and costs of removal to each side, but the signed order's text does not separately mention that allocation.
- This is an unreported district court order resting on a stipulation, so it carries no precedential weight.
Why It Matters
The order is a short, stipulated disposition with limited precedential value. It does show one practical path for a plaintiff who believes a removed federal claim is jurisdictionally weak. Rather than litigate standing in a contested motion, the plaintiff can give up that claim, with the defendant's consent, and return to state court. It also reflects a judge's use of standing-order procedures to encourage cooperation before motion practice.
Practitioners should note what the order does not do. It does not address whether the court could have retained supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, it does not decide standing, and it does not state whether the withdrawal operates with or without prejudice. Those questions remain open, and the state court will now hear the remaining claims.