Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Plaintiff John Doe, a non-verbal autistic four-year-old preschool student, attended the Cameron Early Intervention Program at Ford Elementary School within the West Contra Costa Unified School District. During the week of May 18, 2025, the program's teacher and paraprofessionals were absent. On May 22, classes were combined due to staffing shortages, and supervision was provided by staff from another class. During outdoor play, Plaintiff was left unattended inside a play structure and bitten twice by another student. District personnel later acknowledged that supervision had been inadequate, that the teacher did not know who was watching Plaintiff, and that the student who bit him had a known history of biting and was not supposed to be alone with other students. Separately, Plaintiff's Individualized Education Program (IEP) required pediatric occupational therapy services, which were allegedly not provided from at least January 2025 through the May 2025 incident, and the District admitted the services had not been provided.
Plaintiff filed suit on May 19, 2026, asserting six claims: (1) ADA Title II, (2) Rehabilitation Act § 504, (3) California Government Code § 11135, (4) California Education Code § 220, (5) negligence per se, and (6) negligent supervision, retention, and training. Defendant moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the first four claims. The parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. The court found the matter suitable for disposition without oral argument.
The Court’s Holding
The court analyzed the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims under the deliberate indifference standard for damages, requiring Plaintiff to show he was denied a reasonable accommodation and that the District acted with deliberate indifference. As to the supervision-and-staffing theory, the court held that generally applicable safety statutes (Education Code §§ 44807, 56001(n); 5 CCR § 5552) do not establish a disability-related accommodation, and the complaint's allegations of inadequate supervision and a known aggressive student do not, without more, plausibly allege denial of a disability-related accommodation or deliberate indifference to a federally protected right. This theory was dismissed with leave to amend. As to the IEP/occupational therapy theory, the court found the allegations sufficient: the IEP expressly required OT services due to Plaintiff's disability, the District knew the services were not provided, and the omission persisted for over four months. This plausibly alleged notice and deliberate indifference, so the motion was denied on this theory.
For the § 11135 claim, the court held it rises and falls with the ADA claim because § 11135(b) incorporates Title II's disability protections. Thus, the claim survives on the OT theory but fails on the supervision theory. For the § 220 claim, the court held that Education Code § 262.3(d) requires a plaintiff to at least file an appeal with the California Department of Education and wait the statutory 60-day period before pursuing civil remedies, reconciling § 262.3(c) and (d) per Annamaria M. and A.W. Because the complaint did not allege Plaintiff pursued any administrative process, the § 220 claim was dismissed with leave to amend. The court also addressed the merits alternatively, finding the supervision theory fails for the same reasons as under the ADA, while the OT theory would suffice but for the exhaustion defect.
Key Takeaways
- A plaintiff must allege a specific disability-related accommodation denial, not merely a general safety violation, to state an ADA or § 504 claim for damages.
- Deliberate indifference requires both knowledge that harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely and a failure to act that is more than negligent.
- An IEP-mandated service (here, occupational therapy) can constitute a reasonable accommodation; failure to provide it for months with the district's knowledge may plausibly allege deliberate indifference.
- California Government Code § 11135 claims incorporate ADA Title II standards and therefore rise and fall with the federal claims.
- California Education Code § 220 claims require administrative exhaustion under § 262.3(d)—at minimum, filing an appeal with the CDE and waiting 60 days—even though § 262.3(c) states exhaustion is not required.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the pleading standards for disability discrimination claims against school districts in the Ninth Circuit, distinguishing between general supervision failures (which sound in negligence) and disability-specific accommodation denials (which support ADA/§ 504 claims). It reinforces that deliberate indifference for damages requires a high bar—more than negligence—and that IEP implementation failures tied to a student's disability can satisfy this standard. The ruling also resolves a split in interpreting California Education Code § 262.3(c) and (d), holding that § 220 plaintiffs must at least initiate the administrative process before filing suit, which has practical implications for plaintiffs' counsel in framing complaints and meeting pre-suit requirements.