Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner, a citizen of Kazakhstan, entered the United States on February 13, 2016, as a B-2 nonimmigrant visitor. On July 2, 2016, she applied for asylum and withholding of removal with USCIS, and the application remains pending. On January 15, 2026, ICE detained her, transferred her to the Imperial Regional Detention Facility, and issued a notice to appear. At a bond hearing on February 27, 2026, she was denied bond.
On March 5, 2026, she petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asserting that her detention violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Fifth Amendment, and immigration laws. The court set a briefing schedule, issued a limited stay to preserve the status quo, and later ordered briefing on whether she had an authorized stay. The warden argued the petition should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Petitioner conceded she had not been granted parole. She contended that she had lived in the United States since 2017 with work authorization and had complied with tax filing requirements, and the court relied on those contentions.
The Court’s Holding
The court first addressed exhaustion. Under Ninth Circuit law, exhaustion is prudential rather than jurisdictional for habeas claims, and a court may waive it where remedies are inadequate, futile, would cause irreparable injury, or the proceedings would be void. The court concluded that the bond determination was directly reviewable by the Board of Immigration Appeals, that an appeal was an available and adequate remedy she had to pursue, and that nothing in the record excused exhaustion. Her claim challenging the bond determination was therefore subject to dismissal.
The court then turned to what it called an inartfully pleaded due process claim based on detention without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. Relying on district court decisions, it found that she held a vested liberty interest in remaining free from detention, based on her years of working and living in the United States with the government's knowledge and authorization and the government's decision not to detain her after her visa expired. Applying Mathews v. Eldridge, the court found that all three factors favored her. Her interest in freedom from bodily restraint was strong. The risk of erroneous deprivation was high because she said she was detained without notice or an opportunity to be heard, and the government did not dispute that. The post-deprivation custody hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) did not cure this, because a pre-deprivation hearing would let a noncitizen stay at liberty while preparing a defense. The government's interest was low because nothing suggested notice and a hearing would be fiscally or administratively burdensome.
The court granted the petition and ordered Respondents to release Petitioner immediately. It enjoined them from re-detaining her without complying with due process. It denied her request for attorneys' fees and costs without prejudice to a proper fee application, and directed the Clerk to close the matter.
Key Takeaways
- A challenge to a bond denial that the Board of Immigration Appeals could review is likely to face dismissal in habeas unless the petitioner exhausts that appeal or shows exhaustion should be excused.
- A noncitizen who entered lawfully, applied for asylum, and lived and worked here for years with the government's knowledge may hold a vested liberty interest in remaining free from detention, according to this court.
- A post-deprivation bond hearing under § 1226(a) did not satisfy due process in this court's analysis, because a pre-deprivation hearing serves a distinct purpose.
- The remedy was release plus an injunction against re-detention without due process; the order does not bar future detention that complies with due process.
Why It Matters
This is an unreported district court order, so it carries no binding precedential weight. Its reasoning rests largely on other district court decisions, which it cites for the proposition that a long-term, lawfully admitted noncitizen develops a protected liberty interest when the government does not act to detain her. The order shows how courts in the district are applying the Mathews framework to immigration arrests that occur without advance process.
Much remains open. The court did not reach the APA or statutory arguments, did not decide the pending asylum application or her removability, and did not address how exhaustion would apply to the due process claim beyond treating the two claims separately. The injunction leaves the government able to detain her again if it first provides due process, and the form of that process was not specified.