Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Michael Reeves, proceeding without a lawyer, filed his complaint on April 2, 2026, in the Central District of California against Pradeep K. Khosla and other defendants. The case was transferred to the Southern District of California on April 14, 2026. The order does not describe the claims in the complaint. Instead of prepaying the filing fee that 28 U.S.C. section 1914(a) requires for civil actions, Reeves submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under 28 U.S.C. section 1915(a).
The court began with the governing framework. A civil action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the full fee only if the court grants IFP leave, citing Andrews v. Cervantes and Rodriguez v. Cook. Although the statute does not spell out the qualifications, the plaintiff's affidavit must allege poverty with some particularity. Under Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015), leave may be proper when paying court costs would leave the plaintiff unable to afford the necessities of life, and the affidavit need not show that the plaintiff is destitute.
Reeves's affidavit, as the court summarized it, stated that he is not employed and that his last employment ended in February 2024. He reported receiving $72 per month in Cash Aid for Adults (GA/GR) and $298 per month in CalFresh food assistance, and he stated that he has no money in any checking or savings account. He also stated that he has lost everything he owns because of ICE and is homeless for the first time in his life. Those are Reeves's own statements in his affidavit as recounted in the order; the court did not make findings about the cause of his circumstances.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the IFP application. It reasoned that, based on Reeves's income, expenses, and bank accounts, he does not appear to have the funds to pay the filing fee and still afford the necessities of life, which is the Escobedo standard. The court did not require Reeves to show that he is destitute. It directed the Clerk of Court to issue a summons.
The ruling is limited to the fee question. The order does not evaluate whether the complaint states a viable claim, does not dismiss any claim or defendant, and does not decide any issue about the defendants' liability. It also does not say whether any further screening of the complaint will occur. Because the court granted the motion outright, no dismissal or leave to amend was at issue, and nothing in the order is a final judgment. The merits, service of process on the defendants, and any response they may file all remain open.
Key Takeaways
- The court granted IFP status to a pro se plaintiff whose affidavit reported no current employment, $72 per month in cash aid, $298 per month in CalFresh benefits, and no funds in checking or savings accounts.
- The governing test, as the court stated it, is whether paying the filing fee would leave the plaintiff unable to afford the necessities of life; the affidavit must allege poverty with some particularity but need not show destitution.
- The order resolves only the fee application and makes no ruling on the merits of Reeves's complaint against Khosla and the other defendants.
- The court directed the Clerk of Court to issue a summons, so the case moves forward in the Southern District of California without prepayment of the filing fee.
Why It Matters
This is a routine, short order, but it shows how a Southern District of California judge applies the Ninth Circuit's IFP standard to a plaintiff living on public benefits. The court focused on concrete figures in the affidavit, namely monthly income, the absence of bank balances, and unemployment since February 2024, and concluded that these facts showed Reeves could not pay the fee and still meet basic needs. Litigants seeking IFP status can take from it that specific financial detail is what the court examines, and that complete destitution is not required.
The order is a district court ruling on a procedural motion, and it is not reported. It has no binding precedential effect and mainly illustrates existing Ninth Circuit law rather than creating new law. Because it says nothing about the merits, the claims against the defendants, and the circumstances Reeves describes, remain untested at this stage.