Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Luis Arlen Ruiz Mejia, a citizen of Nicaragua, entered the United States in 2003. The parties disagree about how he entered: he says he was detained and then paroled with a Notice to Appear, while the government says he entered without inspection. The court found that dispute immaterial and held no evidentiary hearing. An immigration judge ordered him removed in absentia on July 29, 2004, and the parties agreed the order became administratively final that day. He then lived in the United States for more than twenty years until ICE arrested him on June 29, 2026. His motion to reopen was denied on August 8, 2026.
Detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) for about 120 days, he filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on September 30, 2026. The court granted in forma pauperis status and appointed counsel, who filed the operative Amended Petition on October 16, 2026. He argued that his detention violates Zadvydas v. Davis because removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, and that his warrantless arrest violated 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a). Respondents argued the petition was premature because the six-month presumptively reasonable period would not end until December 29, 2026. They said they intend to effectuate removal but otherwise did not address the merits of the Zadvydas claim.
The Court’s Holding
The court first held that the presumptively reasonable six-month period under Zadvydas runs from the date the removal order becomes administratively final, not from the date of detention. Relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, and several district court decisions, including Southern District of California rulings, it rejected the government's position that the period restarts upon a new arrest. Because the order became final on July 29, 2004, the presumptive period ended January 29, 2005, and the current detention is not presumptively reasonable.
The Zadvydas burden-shifting framework then applied. The court found that Ruiz Mejia met his initial burden of showing good reason to believe removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Respondents did not dispute that they had made no progress toward removing him in twenty years, and he attested that no officer had spoken with him about travel documents or travel plans. Respondents submitted no declarations or documentary evidence and offered only a statement of intent to remove him to Nicaragua. Citing decisions that found stronger government efforts insufficient, the court concluded the government failed to rebut and that detention is no longer reasonable or authorized by statute.
The court granted the Amended Petition and ordered Respondents to release Ruiz Mejia immediately, subject to appropriate conditions of supervision to be determined by immigration authorities under applicable statutory and regulatory procedures. It denied the temporary restraining order motion as moot and did not reach the warrantless arrest claim.
Key Takeaways
- Under this order, the Zadvydas six-month presumptive period is measured from the date the removal order becomes administratively final, so a decades-old order leaves a later detention without any presumption of reasonableness.
- Once a detainee gives good reason to believe removal is unlikely, the government must come forward with evidence, and a bare statement of intent to remove was not enough.
- The court ordered release subject to supervision conditions set by immigration authorities, so the order contemplates supervised release rather than unconditional freedom.
- The court did not decide the warrantless arrest claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a).
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished district court order in a single habeas case. It binds only the parties and carries no precedential weight, but it joins other Southern District of California decisions rejecting the argument that a new detention restarts the Zadvydas clock.
The ruling rests on the statutory limits of detention under § 1231 as construed in Zadvydas, not on a separate constitutional holding. The removal order itself and the denial of reopening were not disturbed. Open matters include the specific supervision conditions, any future change in the likelihood of removal, and the unaddressed arrest claim.