Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Celene Chery, a native and citizen of Haiti, entered the United States on November 11, 2023, seeking asylum. According to the order, the Department of Homeland Security released her on recognizance, she later submitted an asylum application to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and she received employment authorization. On August 13, 2026, she was apprehended on her way to work and taken into custody, where she remained. In a habeas petition filed September 23, 2026 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, she alleged that the government had identified no materially changed circumstances that would justify detaining her after she applied for asylum.
The court set a briefing schedule on September 30, 2026, and Respondents answered on October 5. Their response described Chery as previously released on parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), but said they had insufficient information about any termination of that parole under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2) to give the court. They cited no change in circumstances since her November 2023 release, and they stated that the government does not oppose the petition and defers to the court on the appropriate relief. Chery filed no traverse.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the petition. It held that re-detaining Chery without notice or an opportunity to be heard violated her due process rights. Citing Morrissey v. Brewer, Young v. Harper, and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, it reasoned that people released from custody, even conditionally, have a liberty interest in continued liberty. It then agreed with courts, quoting Saravia v. Sessions (N.D. Cal. 2017), that once a noncitizen has been released, agents may not rearrest the person merely because of removal proceedings. They must present evidence of materially changed circumstances, meaning dangerousness, flight risk, or a final removal order, and a noncitizen who disputes that showing is entitled to a prompt hearing before an immigration judge. The court also cited Kamalpreet v. Singh, which quoted Pinchi v. Noem for the idea that release creates an implicit promise that liberty will be revoked only if the conditions of release are violated.
Applying that standard, the court stated that DHS released Chery in November 2023 and that there had been no change in circumstance since then, so she is entitled to remain released on the same conditions. The writ has two parts. Chery must be released on the same terms and conditions as her November 2023 release, and Respondents are enjoined and restrained from detaining her until she is given notice of the reasons for revocation of parole and a hearing to determine whether detention is warranted. The order is brief. It does not decide whether her original release was recognizance or parole, and it does not specify the forum or procedures for the required hearing.
Key Takeaways
- The court treated release from immigration custody, even conditional release, as creating a liberty interest that supports due process protection against re-detention.
- Following Saravia, the order states that agents must show materially changed circumstances, such as dangerousness, flight risk, or a final removal order, before rearresting a released noncitizen.
- The relief is conditional rather than a bar on all future detention: Respondents may not detain Chery until she receives notice of the reasons for revocation of parole and a hearing on whether detention is warranted.
- The government's lack of opposition and its failure to identify any changed circumstance framed the case, but the court rested its ruling on due process principles and the absence of changed circumstances.
- The immigration-specific authorities the court relied on are district court decisions, so the order shows a trend in trial courts rather than binding appellate law.
Why It Matters
This is a short, unreported district court order in a single habeas case, and it does not bind other courts. It does show how a judge in the Southern District of California applies the changed-circumstances framework to a person who was released after arriving and seeking asylum and was later arrested without any explanation in the record.
Important questions remain open. The order does not decide whether Chery could lawfully be detained again if the government gives notice and shows changed circumstances at a hearing. It also does not resolve the legal character of her original release, since the petition described recognizance and Respondents described parole. Because Respondents did not oppose the petition, the court heard no contrary argument on the scope of the government's detention authority, which counsels caution in reading the reasoning beyond similar facts.