California Case Summaries

Santos v. United States 9th Circuit District Court — Court Denies Fee-Waiver and Counsel Requests Without Prejudice Over Inconsistent Financial Claims

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Santos v. United States 9th Circuit District Court
Court
U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
Judge
Cathy Ann Bencivengo (Barack Obama, 2012)
Date Decided
2026-10-27
Docket No.
3:26-cv-05946
Status
Unreported
Topics
in forma pauperis, appointment of counsel, financial affidavit, judicial immunity, pro se litigants

Background

Elliot J. Santos, proceeding without counsel, filed a civil complaint against the "United States 9th Circuit District Court" in the Southern District of California, together with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and a motion to appoint counsel. Civil litigants ordinarily must pay a $405 fee, consisting of a $350 filing fee and a $55 administrative fee. The administrative fee does not apply to those granted IFP status. To qualify under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a plaintiff must allege poverty with particularity, definiteness, and certainty.

Santos's financial affidavit stated that he had no income and only $110 in expenses over the previous twelve months. His motion to appoint counsel, however, stated monthly living expenses of $1,700. He also asserted that he was owed "$11 trillion" by a presidential administration and "$750k" by a county sheriff. The court found these statements contradictory and implausible. The court also said the complaint was nearly impossible to decipher. It referred to matters such as stock-market "inside secrets" and a 2026 gubernatorial election without making clear what happened, when, who was responsible, or how the allegations connected.

The Court’s Holding

The court denied the IFP motion without prejudice. It ordered Santos, by December 1, 2026, either to pay the required filing fee or to file a new IFP motion that accurately accounts for his income and expenses. If he does neither by that date, the Clerk is directed to dismiss the action without prejudice and close the case. That dismissal is a contingent consequence of noncompliance, not a ruling on the merits, and the order itself did not dismiss the complaint.

The court did not screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It explained in a footnote that if a renewed IFP motion is granted, screening would follow and the current complaint "would be subject to dismissal." It identified two problems. The named defendant is a federal district court, and "generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages." The pleading is also too unclear to show what is alleged. These were observations about likely future screening, not findings or a dismissal.

The court also denied the motion to appoint counsel without prejudice. It noted there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case, and that under § 1915(e)(1) a court may only "request" an attorney for an indigent litigant in "exceptional circumstances." That inquiry weighs the likelihood of success on the merits and the plaintiff's ability to articulate his claims given their legal complexity. As the case stands, Santos had shown neither a likelihood of success nor legal complexity warranting referral to potential pro bono counsel.

Key Takeaways

  • An IFP applicant must describe poverty with particularity, and a financial affidavit that conflicts with the applicant's other filings, or relies on implausible claims of large debts owed, may be denied.
  • Denial of IFP status was without prejudice, so the plaintiff may cure by paying the fee or submitting an accurate new application by the December 1, 2026 deadline.
  • If the deadline is missed, the Clerk is directed to dismiss the action without prejudice and close the case.
  • Federal courts cannot compel counsel in civil cases. They may only request volunteer counsel in exceptional circumstances, assessed by likelihood of success and the ability to articulate complex claims.
  • The court's remarks on judicial immunity and an indecipherable complaint were warnings about future screening, not a ruling dismissing the complaint.

Why It Matters

The order is not reported and carries no precedential weight. It is useful as a routine illustration of how a district court handles IFP applications at the threshold. It applies settled Ninth Circuit standards requiring consistent, particularized financial disclosure, and it shows that internally conflicting affidavits can stall a case before the complaint is reviewed. It also shows that requests for appointed counsel fail without a showing of potential merit or real legal complexity.

Much remains open. Santos may pay the fee or submit a corrected IFP motion, and the court has not decided whether any renewed motion would be granted. If one is granted, the complaint would still face screening for frivolousness, failure to state a claim, and immunity, and the court has resolved none of the merits. Because the counsel denial was also without prejudice, the issue could be revisited if circumstances change.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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