Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Henry A.V.L., identified by first name and last initials, entered the United States without inspection about six years earlier and was arrested by immigration authorities in February 2026 on his way to work. He has been detained since. In May 2026 the court granted his habeas petition in part and ordered release unless respondents showed within seven days that he had received a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its regulations. An immigration judge denied bond after a May 20 hearing.
Petitioner moved to enforce the judgment, and on July 10, 2026 the court again ordered a compliant hearing or release. He received two hearings on July 17, the second with Spanish and Mam interpreters after he said Mam is his best language. The immigration judge denied bond in a written order, stating that Petitioner bore the burden by a preponderance of the evidence and finding him a flight risk. Petitioner filed a second motion to enforce. He argued that the judge misallocated the burden, wrongly found flight risk, and ignored alternatives to detention, and he sought release or another hearing.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the motion. Other pending motions were denied as moot, and the case remains closed. It reviewed the bond decision for abuse of discretion, under which it cannot reweigh evidence and asks only whether the correct legal standard was applied. Petitioner argued that the government must prove flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. The court rejected that argument. Its earlier orders required a hearing under § 1226(a) and its regulations. Under Ninth Circuit authority the detainee must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not a danger or flight risk.
The court found the judge's written and oral explanations sufficient on flight risk. The judge cited the lack of a fixed address, a relatively recent entry without inspection, limited community ties and no property, and a partner without legal status whose family lives in Guatemala. The judge also found no credible sponsor, noting a conflict between the sponsor's stated arrival date of 2023 and Petitioner's testimony of 2020, and Petitioner's inability to explain reporting only $364 in income. The judge further noted a removal order now on appeal, no expressed fear of return, and no apparent other relief. The court rejected the claim that the Guerra factors were ignored and approved reliance on the removal order. Disagreement with the weighing did not show an abuse of discretion.
On alternatives to detention, the court held that a judge need only consider conditions of release after finding the detainee neither dangerous nor so great a flight risk as to require detention without bond. The judge found a significant flight risk that no bond amount could mitigate. There was therefore no legal obligation to consider alternatives, even if the judge did not obviously do so.
Key Takeaways
- Under this order's reading of Ninth Circuit authority, a detainee in a § 1226(a) bond hearing must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not a flight risk or danger; the government does not carry a clear-and-convincing burden.
- Federal review of an immigration judge's bond determination in this posture asks only whether the correct legal standard was applied, and the court will not reweigh the evidence.
- An order that cites Guerra and lists its factors defeats a claim that the factors were ignored, and a removal order may permissibly weigh toward flight risk.
- An immigration judge need not consider alternatives to detention once finding the detainee so great a flight risk that detention without bond is required.
- A motion to enforce is not a vehicle for relitigating the merits of a bond decision when the court-ordered hearing was actually provided.
Why It Matters
This is a district court order not designated as reported, so it carries no binding precedential weight. Its value lies in showing how this court applies Ninth Circuit authority in post-judgment enforcement proceedings. It treats the earlier directive for a hearing under § 1226(a) as requiring the existing burden allocation, not a heightened government burden.
The ruling is limited to the record of the July 17 hearing. Petitioner's removal order remains on appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and nothing here decides the merits of that appeal. Nothing in the order precludes a later hearing request based on changed circumstances.