Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Justin Salmen, a California state prisoner proceeding without counsel, sued two prison officials, E. Harper and James, in the Eastern District of California. His complaint alleges that they failed to protect him from an assault by another inmate and then tried to cover up that failure. Because the complaint seeks relief from governmental officers, the court was required to screen it under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any portion that is frivolous, fails to state a claim, or seeks money from an immune defendant. The order applies the familiar pleading standard: a short and plain statement with enough facts to make the claim plausible on its face under Twombly and Iqbal, read liberally for a pro se litigant, but without supplying essential elements that the plaintiff did not plead.
The order recites the following allegations, which are taken as true only for screening and are not findings. On June 26, 2026, Harper allegedly rejected Salmen's safety concerns about an inmate he was housed with, saying that staff at Mule Creek do not help gay prisoners. On July 1, 2026, Salmen says he was attacked in his cell. He alleges that another inmate in the cell warned James of the attack that day and that James ignored the warning. Salmen also alleges that, after he filed a grievance about the failure to protect, Harper forged a document to cover up his failings. Salmen had filed two applications to proceed in forma pauperis, which the order also resolved.
The Court’s Holding
Reviewing the complaint at screening, Magistrate Judge Jeremy D. Peterson found that the allegations against Harper and James are sufficient to state Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims. The order is brief on this point. It relies on the alleged rejection of safety concerns days before the attack and the alleged disregard of a same-day warning, and it does not walk through the elements of deliberate indifference. This is a conclusion about pleading sufficiency, not a finding that the events occurred, and service has not yet been directed.
The court found the due process claim non-cognizable. Citing Ramirez v. Galaza, it reasoned that there is no constitutional right to any specific grievance procedure and no right to have defendants disciplined by their superiors, and it noted that Salmen does not allege that the claimed cover-up injured him in any other way. The order does not enter a final judgment or a dismissal with prejudice; instead it lets Salmen choose how to proceed.
The court granted Salmen's second application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4) and denied the earlier one (ECF No. 2) as moot. Within thirty days, Salmen may confirm that he will proceed only on the Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims, in which case the judge states he will direct service on those defendants, or file an amended complaint, which will delay service on any defendant. An amended complaint must be complete in itself, use the form the Clerk is to send, and be titled Amended Complaint. The order does not say what happens if Salmen does not respond.
Key Takeaways
- At screening, allegations that an officer rejected a prisoner's safety concerns and that another officer ignored a same-day warning were enough to plead Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims.
- Under the reasoning in this order, a due process claim based on an alleged grievance cover-up is not cognizable where the plaintiff identifies no right to a particular grievance procedure and no other injury from the cover-up.
- The court did not enter a final judgment; Salmen may instead file an amended complaint, which delays service on all defendants.
- Service will be directed if Salmen confirms within thirty days that he will proceed on the Eighth Amendment claims.
- The order is an unpublished screening ruling that accepts allegations as true and decides nothing about the merits.
Why It Matters
This is a short, unpublished magistrate-judge screening order, so it carries no precedential weight and settles nothing beyond the sufficiency of the pleading at this early stage. Its practical value is as an example of how the Eastern District of California sorts a prisoner complaint at the threshold: a failure-to-protect theory grounded in specific, dated allegations moves forward, while a theory that treats a mishandled grievance as a constitutional violation does not.
Much remains open. Defendants have not been served, and whether Salmen can prove the alleged warnings and refusals, or the required state of mind, is untested. Whether he will amend, and whether any amendment could cure the due process deficiency the court identified, will be known only after his election.