California Case Summaries

Rojas v. Aramark Company — Magistrate Judge Recommends Dismissing Prisoner’s Second Lawsuit as Duplicative of Earlier Identical Case

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Rojas v. Aramark Company, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
Judge
Ila C. Deiss (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, 2026)
Date Decided
2026-10-16
Docket No.
2:26-cv-03394
Status
Unreported
Topics
duplicative lawsuits, prisoner civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, findings and recommendations, pro se litigation, amended complaint, objections deadline

Background

Richard Rojas, a prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Eastern District of California against Aramark Company and other defendants. The case was opened as No. 2:26-cv-03394. The order says the complaint is pending and refers generally to any pending motions, but it does not describe the underlying factual allegations or evaluate whether the claims have merit.

Magistrate Judge Ila C. Deiss compared the new filing with an earlier case brought by the same plaintiff, Rojas v. Aramark Company, et al., No. 2:26-cv-03366-ICD. She found the new action almost identical to the first: the parties listed in the complaint, the claims, and the relief sought were all the same. The order relied on Adams v. California Department of Health Services, 487 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, which states that plaintiffs generally have no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court against the same defendant. Under that decision, a court asks whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or their privies, are the same.

The Court’s Holding

The order has two parts with different legal force. The binding part directs the Clerk to randomly assign a district judge, and the docket reflects assignment to District Judge Dena M. Coggins. The remaining part is only a recommendation: that the action be dismissed as duplicative of No. 2:26-cv-03366-ICD and that any pending motions be denied as moot. The magistrate judge did not herself dismiss the case, and no final judgment has been entered.

The court's reasoning was practical. Where Rojas wants the court to note changes, he can add them through an amended complaint in the first action rather than by filing a second lawsuit. The findings and recommendations were submitted to the assigned district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections within 14 days after service, and responses are due within 14 days after objections are served. The order warns that failing to object within the time allowed may waive the right to appeal, citing Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). The order does not say whether a dismissal would be with or without prejudice, and it does not address the merits or screening of the first action.

Key Takeaways

  • A magistrate judge recommended dismissing a prisoner's second § 1983 complaint because the parties, claims, and relief sought matched those in an earlier case in the same court.
  • The recommendation is not a final dismissal. The assigned district judge must still decide whether to adopt it, and the order does not specify whether any dismissal would be with or without prejudice.
  • According to the order, changes a plaintiff wants the court to consider should be added by amended complaint in the first action, not by filing a new case.
  • Objections are due within 14 days after service of the findings and recommendations, and failing to object within that time may waive the right to appeal.
  • The order does not evaluate the merits of the underlying claims against Aramark Company and the other defendants.

Why It Matters

The order is a short, routine application of the rule against duplicative litigation in a prisoner civil rights case. It shows how the Eastern District handles repeat filings: rather than allowing two identical cases to proceed, the court points the plaintiff to the earlier case and to the amendment process. It is a magistrate judge's recommendation, not a ruling by a district judge, and it carries little precedential weight beyond illustrating the Ninth Circuit standard it applies.

For litigants, particularly those without counsel, the practical lesson is that a second filing will not cure problems in the first and may be dismissed. Because the dismissal is only recommended, the plaintiff's opportunity to object and the district judge's independent decision determine whether the second case ends. In any event, the first action is where the order directs the plaintiff to seek to add any changes by amendment.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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