Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Robin Michelle Temple, representing herself in the Eastern District of California, sued the County of Nevada and twenty Doe County employees. She alleges she was stalked and harassed beginning in September 2024 and that a state court issued a criminal protective order against the individual on September 30, 2024. She alleges that on December 9, 2024, after a criminal proceeding about violations of that order, County employees told her that the County or law enforcement could not keep her safe and asked whether she had somewhere else to stay. A sheriff's deputy was dispatched while she prepared to leave. She alleges she received no help relocating, became homeless, and ended up less safe. She also alleges the protective order was vacated in June 2025 and that she was not told until January 2026. These are allegations taken as true only for screening, not findings.
Temple asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the California Bane Act. Because she sought to proceed in forma pauperis, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. section 1915(e)(2)(B). She also moved for appointment of counsel and for filing-access accommodations tied to her disability. The matter was decided by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. section 636 and Local Rule 302(c).
The Court’s Holding
The court granted in forma pauperis status, finding the financial showing sufficient. It then found the complaint deficient under Rule 8 because it referred collectively to 'County personnel' and similar groups without tying specific acts to specific actors. On the section 1983 state-created danger theory, the court explained that the Due Process Clause generally imposes no duty to protect against third parties. The exception requires affirmative state conduct that places a person in danger she would not otherwise have faced, and the court found the complaint alleged only omissions, such as a temporary deputy dispatch, failure to help with relocation, an inadequate investigation, and a prosecutor's declination. Temple conceded the deputy never forced or formally ordered her to leave, so the court found no plausible coercion.
The Monell claim against the County failed for two reasons. The complaint listed generalized County systems and conclusory references to customs and failures to train without identifying a specific policy, its content, or how it caused her injury. And without an underlying constitutional violation, municipal liability could not stand. The ADA claim failed because the complaint did not clearly identify the County services, programs, or activities she was denied and did not plead non-conclusory facts showing deliberate indifference, which is the standard for intentional discrimination and damages. The Bane Act claim failed because it requires an interference with constitutional rights, which was not adequately pleaded.
The complaint was dismissed with leave to amend, not with prejudice. Temple has 30 days to file a complete amended complaint that stands alone under Local Rule 220. The court warned that failure to comply may lead to a recommendation that the action be dismissed. Her motion for appointment of counsel was denied without prejudice because no exceptional circumstances were shown. Her accommodation request was denied, a standing extension of time was refused, and she was told to file a tailored good-cause request tied to any specific deadline. Nothing on the merits has been finally decided.
Key Takeaways
- A state-created danger claim requires affirmative government conduct that exposes the plaintiff to a danger she would not otherwise have faced, and failures to act or protect generally do not qualify.
- A Monell claim must identify the particular municipal policy or custom and plead facts connecting it to the injury, and lists of County systems or boilerplate failure-to-train language will not suffice.
- An ADA Title II damages claim requires specific allegations about the public services or programs denied and facts showing deliberate indifference.
- A Bane Act claim based on constitutional interference fails when the underlying constitutional violation is not adequately pleaded.
- Self-represented litigants get liberal construction and a chance to amend, but an amended complaint must give each defendant fair notice of who did what and must be complete in itself.
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished district-court screening order by a magistrate judge, so it carries no precedential weight. It is useful mainly as an illustration of how the Eastern District of California applies Ninth Circuit authority to claims that a government failed to protect someone from a private person. It stresses the line between affirmative conduct and inaction, and the need to plead municipal policy with specifics.
The practical consequence is limited and open-ended. Dismissal with leave to amend is not a final judgment, and Temple may still replead any of the claims if she can allege additional facts. The order also shows how courts handle accommodation requests from disabled pro se litigants, granting no blanket relief but leaving room for targeted, good-cause requests.