Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Tariq S. Ware, a state prisoner, filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Eastern District of California, naming the California Superior Court, Sacramento County, as respondent. On initial review, the magistrate judge found that his claim appeared unexhausted, because Ware acknowledged that he had not presented it to the California Supreme Court before filing the federal action. Instead of recommending dismissal at once, the judge offered Ware a chance to amend and explain why the case should proceed anyway.
Ware then filed an amended petition. He explained that he skipped the state's highest court because his claim relies on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Chatrie v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 2193 (2026). The magistrate judge understood him to argue that, because Chatrie is in his words a watershed case, he need not exhaust the claim in state court. The matter was before the court for preliminary review under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which directs the judge to order a response unless it plainly appears the petitioner is not entitled to relief. The order does not describe the underlying conviction or the substance of the claim.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge rejected Ware's argument and recommended that the amended petition be dismissed as unexhausted. This is a recommendation, not a final judgment. It is submitted to the assigned district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and the materials do not show that the district judge has acted on it. The only directive actually issued was an order for the Clerk to assign a district judge; the register entry reflects reassignment to Chief District Judge Troy L. Nunley.
The reasoning begins with the rule that a federal habeas court may not consider a claim until the petitioner has presented it to the highest state court, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) and Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2003), which requires that no state remedies remain available when the federal petition is filed. The judge then turned to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), under which new constitutional rules of criminal procedure generally do not apply to cases that became final before the rule was announced, subject to exceptions such as procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Generously, the judge said, Ware's claim might fall within an exception, but the order does not decide that question.
Even if it does, the judge concluded, Ware must still exhaust the claim in state court. The order cites Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1965), and Campanale v. Harris, 724 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1983), which observed that federal-state friction is greater when a petitioner seeks retroactive application of a Supreme Court decision issued after the state courts considered his case, so the state courts should first have the chance to apply the changed law. The judge's bottom line was that Ware should present his claim to the highest state court before a federal habeas court considers it. The order does not say whether dismissal would be with or without prejudice.
Key Takeaways
- A state prisoner generally must present a claim to the California Supreme Court before a federal court will consider it under § 2254, even when the claim rests on a very recent Supreme Court decision.
- Calling a new decision a watershed ruling does not replace exhaustion; the magistrate judge treated Teague retroactivity and exhaustion as separate questions.
- The judge only assumed that Ware's claim might fit a Teague exception, so whether Chatrie applies retroactively on collateral review remains undecided.
- The ruling is a recommendation, and the district judge must decide whether to adopt it after any objections.
- Objections are due within fourteen days of service, and failing to file them in time may waive the right to appeal the district court's order.
Why It Matters
This is a non-final magistrate judge recommendation in a single prisoner's case, so it carries no precedential weight. Its value is illustrative: it shows how a federal court screening a habeas petition handles the argument that a newly decided Supreme Court case lets a petitioner go straight to federal court. The answer is that retroactivity and exhaustion are distinct, and the state courts get the first opportunity to apply the new decision.
Much remains open. The district judge may adopt, modify, or reject the recommendation, and nothing here addresses the merits of Ware's claim, the scope of Chatrie, or what may happen if Ware pursues state remedies and later returns to federal court.