Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Yuly Jovany Piedrahita Motta, who is representing himself, petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his ongoing immigration detention and moved for a temporary restraining order. Count Two raised a due process challenge to the length of his mandatory detention. The court had already ruled in M.M. v. Bondi and Nasar v. Warden that noncitizens detained upon entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) whose mandatory detention has become unreasonably prolonged are entitled to a bond hearing, and that a further hearing may be required after prolonged detention following an initial bond determination. On September 24, 2026, the court told the parties it was considering ruling on the petition and the restraining order motion together and directed Respondents to identify any factual or legal issue materially distinguishing this case.
Respondents acknowledged factual similarities with M.M. and Nasar and conceded that before the Ninth Circuit's September 21, 2026 decision in Padilla v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement the case would fall within those rulings. They argued that Padilla recognizes the continued applicability of the entry fiction, so that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) requires detention with no bond hearing and no release other than humanitarian parole. They also noted that the earlier petitioners had been detained over fourteen months while Petitioner had been detained about seven when he filed, but offered no argument that the difference mattered. Respondents did not oppose a simultaneous merits ruling.
The Court’s Holding
The court held that Padilla does not displace its earlier decisions. It explained that Padilla treated the entry fiction as an issue in 'an admission, not a detention, case,' and described admission and detention as occupying 'fundamentally different positions in our legal order.' Padilla recognized plenary executive power over admission while reaffirming that the government cannot arbitrarily detain people, including noncitizens, and it declined the government's request to expand the doctrine to the plaintiff class there. The court added that numerous courts in the Ninth Circuit read Padilla as concerning admissibility rather than detention, citing decisions from the Central District of California and the Western District of Washington. Because Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his present detention, not his admissibility, Padilla did not change the due process analysis, and Respondents identified no other material distinction.
The court granted the petition and the restraining order motion as to Count Two only, for the reasons in M.M. and Nasar, and found a post-deprivation bond hearing to be the proper remedy. Within 14 days Respondents must give Petitioner a bond hearing before an immigration judge, at which the government bears the burden of justifying continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. They must give Petitioner and his counsel seven days' notice and let counsel attend. If Respondents do not comply, Petitioner is to be released immediately. A status report certifying compliance and attaching the immigration judge's order is due within 17 days. The request for immediate release was denied. The court did not reach the petition's other grounds and did not wait for a reply, given that Petitioner is self-represented. It directed entry of judgment for Petitioner and closed the case.
Key Takeaways
- The court read Padilla as an admission case that leaves the due process limits on detention intact.
- The remedy is a bond hearing within 14 days, with the government bearing a clear and convincing evidence burden, not an order of release.
- Release is required only if Respondents fail to comply, and the request for immediate release was denied.
- Only the Count Two due process claim was decided, and the petition's other grounds were left unaddressed.
- This is an unreported district court order that relies on the same court's earlier decisions, so it is persuasive at most.
Why It Matters
This is a single district court's order applying its own prior rulings. It is unreported and carries no binding precedential weight. Its value is as an example of a court rejecting the argument that Padilla's reaffirmation of the entry fiction eliminates bond hearings for prolonged detention. The court cited other district courts reading Padilla the same way but did not cite any Ninth Circuit decision resolving the question.
Several matters remain open. The order does not say what the immigration judge will decide at the hearing, and it does not address any appeal. It also sets no bright-line point at which detention becomes unreasonably prolonged. Respondents' point that Petitioner had been held for a shorter time than the earlier petitioners was rejected only because they offered no argument that it mattered.