Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Steven Ralph Davis sued Frank Bisignano, the Commissioner of Social Security, in the Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division, in Case No. 2:26-cv-01591. The document at issue is not a merits ruling. It is a joint stipulation and order concerning attorney fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The papers do not describe the underlying benefits dispute, the relief obtained on the merits, or any earlier ruling, so none of that can be stated here.
The stipulation, dated October 15, 2026, and filed the next day, says the parties agreed, subject to court approval, that plaintiff would receive $9,200.00 in fees and expenses and no costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The amount is described as compensation for all legal services rendered by counsel in this civil action. The parties also addressed how payment would work once an order issued, citing Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010), which treats EAJA fees as belonging to the litigant and so potentially reachable by a federal debt offset.
The Court’s Holding
Chief District Judge Troy L. Nunley signed a short order on October 15, 2026. Based on the stipulation, it orders that fees and expenses of $9,200.00 as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and no costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, be awarded subject to the terms of the Stipulation. The order contains no independent analysis of prevailing-party status, whether the government's position was substantially justified, or whether the hours claimed were reasonable. It simply adopts the agreed figure.
The incorporated terms matter. The stipulation states that it is a compromise settlement of plaintiff's request for EAJA fees and is not an admission of liability by the defendant under the EAJA or otherwise. Payment of the agreed amount is to operate as a complete release of, and bar to, any claims that plaintiff or his counsel may have relating to EAJA fees in this action. The government also agreed that, after the order issues, it will consider plaintiff's assignment of fees to counsel, and that whether it can honor the assignment depends on whether the fees are subject to offset under the Treasury Offset Program.
Payment is to be made payable to plaintiff. If the Department of the Treasury determines that plaintiff owes no federal debt, the government will cause payment to be made directly to counsel under the executed assignment, by electronic funds transfer or check. The award is also without prejudice to counsel's right to seek fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) of the Social Security Act, subject to the EAJA savings clause. Nothing in the order decides any § 406(b) request.
Key Takeaways
- The court awarded $9,200.00 in EAJA fees and expenses and no § 1920 costs, but did so by adopting the parties' stipulation rather than deciding a contested fee motion.
- The stipulation is expressly a compromise settlement and carries no admission of liability by the Commissioner.
- Whether the money goes to the plaintiff or directly to counsel depends on the Treasury offset determination made after the order, so direct payment to counsel is not guaranteed.
- Counsel's ability to seek fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is preserved but left open, and the order decides neither entitlement nor amount.
- The order is a routine stipulated fee award with no merits reasoning, so it carries little precedential weight.
Why It Matters
This is an ordinary stipulated disposition of an EAJA fee request. Its value lies in showing how such awards are structured, not in any new rule of law. The court did not analyze prevailing-party status or substantial justification, so the order should not be cited for how those questions are resolved.
Practitioners should note how the stipulation handles the assignment problem after Ratliff: the award runs to the litigant, and the government reserves a post-order offset check before any direct payment to counsel. The reservation of § 406(b) rights also shows that EAJA and Social Security fee awards must be coordinated, subject to the EAJA savings clause referenced in the stipulation. The order is a district court ruling, not published precedent. It leaves open the offset outcome, the actual payee, and any later § 406(b) petition.