California Case Summaries

Broadus-Bynum v. De Los Santos — Prisoner’s Section 1983 Case Dismissed for Failure to Prosecute After No Amended Complaint or Objections

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Broadus-Bynum v. De Los Santos
Court
U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
Judge
Troy L. Nunley (Barack Obama, 2013)
Date Decided
2026-10-16
Docket No.
2:25-cv-02717
Status
Unreported
Topics
civil rights, prisoner litigation, failure to prosecute, magistrate judge findings and recommendations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Background

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against De Los Santos and other defendants in the Eastern District of California. The case was referred to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. According to the magistrate judge, the complaint was dismissed with leave to amend on April 8, 2026, and plaintiff was given 30 days to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff was specifically cautioned that failure to do so would result in a recommendation of dismissal.

The magistrate judge found that the time to amend had expired and that plaintiff had not filed an amended complaint, sought an extension, or otherwise communicated with the court. Weighing the five factors in Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992), the magistrate judge reasoned that plaintiff had not stated a claim for relief and the case could not move forward without plaintiff's participation, so the factors favored dismissal. The findings and recommendations, filed June 18, 2026 as ECF No. 12, allowed fourteen days for objections and warned that failing to object might waive the right to appeal the district court's order.

The Court’s Holding

Chief District Judge Troy L. Nunley, by order signed October 15, 2026 and filed October 16, 2026, adopted the findings and recommendations in full. The order recites that the findings were served with notice of the fourteen-day objection period, that no party filed timely objections, and that the time to object has elapsed. The court stated that it presumes findings of fact are correct, citing Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir. 1979), and reviews the magistrate judge's conclusions of law de novo, citing Britt v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983). After reviewing the file, it found the recommendations supported by the record and by the magistrate judge's analysis.

The operative ruling is short: the findings and recommendations are adopted, the action is dismissed for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), and the Clerk is directed to close the case. The Ferdik analysis comes from the adopted findings rather than from separate reasoning in the district judge's order. The order does not state whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice, and it does not decide the merits of the underlying section 1983 allegations, which were never tested because no amended complaint followed the leave-to-amend ruling.

Key Takeaways

  • The April 2026 dismissal was with leave to amend and therefore not final; the case ended only when plaintiff did not amend and the court entered the October 2026 dismissal for failure to prosecute.
  • The Ferdik factor analysis appears in the magistrate judge's findings, which the district judge adopted after finding them supported by the record.
  • The magistrate judge's earlier warning that failure to amend would lead to a dismissal recommendation was part of the record supporting dismissal.
  • Because no objections were filed, the district court adopted the recommendations without contested briefing, and plaintiff had been told that not objecting might waive the right to appeal.
  • The order is an unreported district court disposition with no precedential weight, and it does not say whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice.

Why It Matters

The order shows how the Eastern District handles a prisoner section 1983 case when the plaintiff goes silent after a leave-to-amend ruling. Leave to amend gives a litigant a defined opportunity to cure pleading defects. Here the 30-day period passed with no amended complaint, extension request, or other communication, and the magistrate judge treated that silence as grounds for dismissal under Rule 41(b).

Much remains unresolved. The order does not decide whether the original allegations could state a claim beyond the magistrate judge's statement that no claim was stated. It does not address the effect of the dismissal on any later refiling, which would depend on how Rule 41(b) applies given the order's silence and on any limitations issues, none of which the court analyzed. Because the order rests on adoption of unopposed findings, it is chiefly an illustration of routine procedure rather than a source of new law.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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