Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Yoel Arias Matos, a Cuban national proceeding without counsel, arrived in the United States on October 19, 2024, for a scheduled CBP One appointment. The Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear charging him as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and released him on humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). The record shows no criminal history. By his own account, he applied for asylum and withholding of removal, obtained work authorization, and has stable employment and housing; the court recited those points as his assertions.
On August 18, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents stopped and arrested him at a truck service area in New York, where he was working as a truck driver. Three days later, DHS and Matos signed a joint motion to withdraw his application for admission and terminate removal proceedings without prejudice, citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1235.4, 1240.1(d), and 1003.25(b). An immigration judge granted the motion, terminated the proceedings, and described him as an arriving alien. He was then transferred to the California City Detention Center. No removal order is in place.
On September 25, 2026, Matos filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a motion for a temporary restraining order. He alleged that detention without pre-deprivation notice and a hearing violated the Fifth Amendment and that 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not § 1225, governs his detention. The government responded that he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4) and 8 C.F.R. § 1235.4 because his application for admission was withdrawn. Neither side asked for a hearing or more briefing, so the court decided the petition on the existing record.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the petition. It held that 8 C.F.R. § 1235.4, the regulation the government invoked, addresses withdrawals permitted by immigration officers. Here an immigration judge allowed the withdrawal, so 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(d) controls, and that regulation says nothing about mandatory detention. Relying on the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Cisneros-Resendiz, the court added that Matos is not an arriving alien in any event, because he is not now trying to enter or transit through a port of entry. He has lived in the interior for two years after being paroled.
The court cited its earlier decision in David R.F., where it was not persuaded that the withdrawal mechanism reaches a paroled person living in the interior, and noted the Ninth Circuit's apparent skepticism on that point in a footnote in Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock. It concluded that Matos is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(a)(4) or § 1240.1(d). It also observed that a person encountered at the border and then paroled is detained under § 1226(a), not § 1225. The government offered little to rebut the due process claim, and nothing in the record showed a parole violation or criminal history, so the court found that re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing violated the Fifth Amendment.
The court ordered Matos released immediately, denied the TRO motion and the motion to appoint counsel as moot, and directed the clerk to close the case and enter judgment for him. It enjoined the government from re-detaining him unless it gives at least seven days' notice and holds a bond hearing before a neutral arbiter under § 1226(a), where the government must show by clear and convincing evidence that he is a flight risk or danger. A footnote requires a hearing within seven days if an arrest without advance notice is legally justified, and permits detention solely to execute a final removal order, with a bond hearing in the time required by law.
Key Takeaways
- The court read 8 C.F.R. § 1235.4 as governing withdrawals permitted by immigration officers, not withdrawals granted by an immigration judge under § 1240.1(d).
- Because Matos was not presently seeking entry at a port of entry, the court held he was not an arriving alien, and the § 1225(a)(4) withdrawal did not make him subject to mandatory detention.
- The court found that re-detaining a paroled person with no criminal history and no shown parole violation, without a pre-deprivation hearing, violated Fifth Amendment due process.
- The seven-day notice requirement and the clear and convincing burden on the government come from the court's injunction in this case, not from the text of § 1226(a).
- The injunction does not bar all future detention: a final removal order or a legally justified arrest without notice can still lead to custody, subject to the stated hearing requirements.
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished district court order, so it is persuasive only and does not bind other courts. It applies Ninth Circuit authority and the court's own earlier rulings to the government's theory that a withdrawal of an application for admission triggers mandatory detention for a person paroled into the interior.
Much remains open. Removal proceedings were terminated without prejudice, and the order does not decide whether Matos may remain in the country or resolve any asylum claim.