Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Segundo Ona Ona, proceeding without counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on September 8, 2026, together with a motion for a temporary restraining order, challenging his detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. On September 9, the Eastern District of California set a briefing schedule on the restraining-order motion, directed respondents to say whether any provision of law or fact distinguished the case from several earlier decisions of the same court, and temporarily enjoined petitioner's transfer or removal to preserve the status quo.
Respondents opposed on September 11, arguing that petitioner was lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Their exhibits showed that he had been ordered removed on September 2, 2026 and had waived appeal. On October 14, respondents moved to lift the transfer injunction, clarified that petitioner is held under the mandatory-detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2), and asked the court to dismiss the petition on that basis.
The order's caption says it denies the petition, but its operative paragraphs dismiss the petition without prejudice. The order does not separately rule on the restraining-order motion, and nothing in it describes the underlying removal proceedings beyond the removal order and the waiver of appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The court concluded that a removal order becomes administratively final when the noncitizen waives the right to appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. For that proposition it cited two federal district court decisions, Montalvan v. Crawford (D. Ariz. 2007) and Tek v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Director (W.D. Wash. 2026). Because petitioner waived appeal of the September 2 removal order, the court treated that order as final. It then relied on the Ninth Circuit's statement in Arango Marquez v. INS, 346 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir. 2003), that detention during the removal period is mandatory, and held that petitioner is currently subject to mandatory detention for the first 90 days after a final removal order.
On that basis the court dismissed the petition without prejudice to refiling after the ninety-day period under § 1231(a)(2) lapses, if petitioner remains in immigration custody past that date. It granted respondents' motion, dissolved its earlier order (Doc. No. 4) temporarily enjoining transfer or removal, and directed the Clerk to close the case. Because the dismissal is without prejudice and expressly contemplates refiling, it is not a ruling on the lawfulness of any detention after the mandatory period. The court did not address the merits of any such later claim or of respondents' initial § 1226(a) theory.
Key Takeaways
- A removal order was treated as administratively final once the noncitizen waived appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which started the mandatory detention period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).
- Relying on Arango Marquez, the court held that detention during the 90-day removal period is mandatory, and it dismissed the § 2241 petition that challenged that detention.
- The dismissal was without prejudice to refiling if petitioner remains in custody after the 90-day period lapses, and the court decided nothing about detention beyond that point.
- Once the government showed a final removal order, the court dissolved its temporary order barring transfer or removal and closed the case.
- The court's own caption describes the petition as denied, but the operative paragraphs dismiss it without prejudice, so the disposition should be read from those paragraphs.
Why It Matters
This short order shows how a district court handles a pro se immigration habeas petition when the government's legal theory shifts. Respondents first defended the detention under § 1226(a) but, after the court's inquiry, clarified that petitioner was held under § 1231(a)(2) following a final removal order. The court accepted that framing without extended analysis, which makes the date of the removal order and the waiver of appeal the pivotal facts.
As a district court order, it does not bind other courts, and it rests on a brief statement of existing law rather than new analysis. Its practical effect is limited: the injunction against transfer or removal is gone, and the petition may be refiled only if petitioner stays in custody beyond the mandatory period. Whether any later claim would succeed is left entirely open.