Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Jose Eduardo Chavez Quispe, a Peruvian citizen, is an immigration detainee proceeding without a lawyer under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Drawing partly on his earlier habeas case, the court recounts that he entered the United States around May 7, 2024, was served with a Notice to Appear, and was released on his own recognizance. He was arrested for DUI in January 2025 and again in March 2026 for DUI and driving without a license, and both sets of charges remain pending. After local police released him, ICE detained him.
In his first petition, the court ruled on April 14, 2026 and ordered a bond hearing within fourteen days under Singh v. Holder, with the government required to prove flight risk or danger by clear and convincing evidence. He then moved to enforce that judgment. On May 28, 2026, the court denied the motion, explaining that he was attacking the sufficiency and accuracy of the evidence behind the immigration judge's bond decision, that the court had ordered a process rather than an outcome, and that complaints about the result belong in the immigration appeals process.
He filed this second petition and a temporary restraining order motion on July 9, 2026. The assigned district judge denied the restraining order motion as untimely on July 14, and Respondents responded, urging dismissal for abuse of the writ.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge first rejected the abuse-of-writ argument. Citing Alaimalo v. United States, the court noted that the doctrine forbids reconsidering claims that were or could have been raised earlier, and that a successive petition with identical grounds must be dismissed absent cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The earlier ruling had addressed detention on statutory and constitutional grounds, but this petition raises a prolonged-detention due process claim. Because such claims are inherently dynamic and evolve as detention lengthens, the court recommends that dismissal on this ground is not warranted.
On the merits, the court recommends denial. It adhered to its earlier conclusion that detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). Under Rodriguez Diaz, the Ninth Circuit held that § 1226(a)'s procedures satisfy due process. It rejected a prolonged-detention claim and held that due process did not require a second bond hearing, with the government bearing a clear-and-convincing burden, for a detainee held fourteen months after his first hearing. Rodriguez Diaz did not foreclose all as-applied challenges, but Petitioner did not show that his case is distinguishable, so the court recommends no relief.
The court itself denied the motion to appoint counsel. Habeas petitioners have no absolute right to counsel, but the Criminal Justice Act allows appointment when the interests of justice require it, judged by likelihood of success and the petitioner's ability to present his claims given their complexity. With denial recommended, he showed no likelihood of success. The recommendation goes to the assigned district judge. Objections are due within fourteen days, limited to fifteen pages, and failing to object may waive appellate rights.
Key Takeaways
- A second habeas petition raising a prolonged-detention due process claim is not necessarily barred as an abuse of the writ, because such claims change as detention continues.
- In this court's view, Rodriguez Diaz establishes that § 1226(a)'s procedures satisfy due process, and a detainee seeking a second bond hearing must show his case is distinguishable.
- Disagreement with an immigration judge's evidentiary conclusions in a bond ruling belongs in the immigration appeals process, not in an enforcement motion.
- This is a recommendation, not a final judgment: the petition remains pending until the district judge rules on it, and the separate denial of appointed counsel rests on the lack of likely success.
- Petitioner has fourteen days to object, and failure to do so may waive appellate rights.
Why It Matters
The recommendation shows how a district court in the Eastern District of California applies Rodriguez Diaz to a detainee who has already received a court-ordered bond hearing. It separates two questions: whether a successive petition is procedurally barred, which it is not here, and whether prolonged detention violates due process, which it does not on this record. Detainees who raise prolonged-detention claims should be ready to explain how their circumstances differ from those in Rodriguez Diaz.
The ruling is not final and has no binding effect until the assigned district judge adopts, modifies or rejects it. Whether the district judge agrees, particularly on the as-applied distinction, remains open.