Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Ryan Duarte sued his former employer, T-Mobile US, Inc., alleging in his second amended complaint (SAC) that it terminated his employment because of his religious belief that he cannot take a COVID-19 vaccine. He asserts religious discrimination under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and a claim under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The SAC newly alleges that the vaccines conflict with Biblical teachings on the value of human life because fetal cells were used in their development. These are allegations accepted as true at the pleading stage, not findings.
T-Mobile moved to dismiss. Relying on Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center, it argued that Duarte alleged no bona fide religious belief conflicting with its vaccination requirement, and it also challenged the notice element. The UCL claim had been dismissed with leave to amend in a May 6, 2026 order (ECF No. 37). In response, Duarte added allegations that he lacks an adequate legal remedy and seeks equitable relief, including restitution and an injunction. The court vacated the hearing and ruled on the papers. The order resolves only the sufficiency of the pleading.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the motion on the FEHA claim. Citing the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Ridings v. PeaceHealth, it explained that the central question is whether the employee's professed beliefs, taken at face value, conflict with the employer's policy. That is a low bar requiring only some nexus between religion and the employee's view of the policy. Ridings found a nexus in a religious objection to the use of fetal cells in COVID-19 vaccines, whereas Detwiler found none where the objection rested on a secular judgment that a nasal swab causes physical harm. Seeing no conflict between the two decisions, the court held that Duarte, who pleads the same religious basis as Ridings, alleged enough.
On notice, an employee need only give enough information for the employer to understand that a conflict exists. As in Weiss v. Permanente Medical Group, it was uncontested that T-Mobile understood Duarte sought a religious rather than secular exemption. Its reply argued only that he never mentioned fetal cells. The court found notice plausibly alleged. This pleading-stage ruling does not decide sincerity, accommodation, or liability.
The court dismissed the UCL claim without leave to amend. A federal plaintiff must plead facts showing he lacks an adequate remedy at law. As to restitution, Duarte again did not explain why legal remedies are inadequate or how restitution differs from the damages he seeks. The court gave as examples that he had not alleged entitlement to unearned wages or a property interest in his employment. As to prospective relief, he alleged a T-Mobile policy of terminating unvaccinated employees but not that he, a former employee, faces a substantial risk of future termination. He therefore lacks Article III standing. Under McGill v. Citibank, his individually directed demand cannot be recast as public injunctive relief. Because leave to amend had already been given, further amendment would be futile. T-Mobile must answer the FEHA claim within 21 days.
Key Takeaways
- At the pleading stage, a religious objection to a COVID-19 vaccine grounded in the use of fetal cells satisfies the nexus requirement for a FEHA failure-to-accommodate claim under Ridings.
- Notice under FEHA requires only enough information for the employer to understand that a religious conflict exists.
- A UCL claim in federal court requires specific facts showing legal remedies are inadequate, including an explanation of how restitution differs from damages.
- A former employee who does not allege a substantial risk of future termination lacks Article III standing for forward-looking relief.
- Only the FEHA claim remains in the case, and the UCL claim is dismissed without leave to amend.
Why It Matters
The order applies Ridings and Detwiler at the pleading stage and treats them as consistent. The question is whether the complaint pleads any nexus between religion and the objection to the policy. Plaintiffs whose allegations rest on a religious fetal-cell objection clear that bar, while objections framed as secular health judgments may not. The notice argument also failed in part because it was uncontested that T-Mobile understood the request to be religious.
The UCL ruling shows how difficult it is to add equitable claims alongside a legal employment claim in federal court. A plaintiff must plead specific facts on the inadequacy of legal remedies and, for injunctive relief, a real risk of future injury. As a district court order, it is not binding precedent and is persuasive at most. It does not resolve the merits of the FEHA claim, which now proceeds to an answer.