Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Lisa S. Bell, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, sued McNeil & Meyers Asset Management Group, LLC, Manny Villegas, and Jeff Hurley on April 3, 2026. She alleges that after she co-signed a May 2025 surety bail bond with All Pro Bail Bonds for her son, defendants reported a $1,140 collection account on her credit report. She alleges that after she disputed the debt and demanded validation and an end to communications, defendants sent the bond contract but not an assignment contract, accounting, or limitations proof, told her to 'call Manny,' and in an October 3, 2025 letter said they had verified the debt. She claims higher auto-financing costs and seeks $16,921 in actual and $20,000 in punitive damages.
The complaint pleaded claims under four Fair Debt Collection Practices Act provisions (15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(b), 1692e, 1692f, 1692c(c)), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (§§ 1681s-2(b), 1681n), and California's Rosenthal Act. On September 9, 2026, the court screened the complaint, found it failed to state a claim, and gave Bell 30 days to amend. She filed nothing, and on October 16, 2026, Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone issued findings and recommendations.
The Court’s Holding
Accepting Bell's own allegations and exhibits, the court found each claim deficient. On § 1692g(b), defendants provided the original creditor's name and address and the contract she signed, and the statute requires nothing more. On § 1692e, she did not allege the debt was paid or satisfied, so reporting its existence was not a false representation, and telling her to 'call Manny' was not deceptive; many allegations were conclusory. On § 1692f, she did not connect any conduct to that provision. On § 1692c(c), Hurley's letter responded to her credit bureau dispute and provided the verification she requested, credit reporting is not a communication with the consumer covered by that section, and the 'call Manny' direction was itself in writing and merely offered another option. On § 1681s-2(b), she did not allege defendants received notice under § 1681i(a)(2) and did not dispute that she was liable. Section 1681n only supplies the private right of action and damages and is not a basis for a claim. The Rosenthal Act claim failed because it depended on the failed FDCPA claims and she identified no authority for a private right of action enforcing the incorporated federal provisions.
The court separately recommended dismissal under Rule 41(b) and Local Rule 110 because Bell did not respond to the order allowing amendment. It found that the public interest in prompt resolution, the need to manage its docket, and the risk of prejudice from delay favored dismissal, and that recommending dismissal without prejudice addressed the availability of less drastic sanctions. It concluded Bell appears to have abandoned the action. The final recommendation is that the case be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim, failure to prosecute, and/or failure to comply with the court's order. This is a recommendation, not a final judgment: Bell has 14 days to file objections of up to 15 pages, and the assigned district judge must decide whether to adopt it. Failure to object may waive challenges to the factual findings on appeal.
Key Takeaways
- Here, giving the original creditor's name and address and the signed contract satisfied § 1692g(b), and the court found the statute required nothing more.
- A verification letter answering a credit bureau dispute was not a violation of a § 1692c(c) cease-communication demand, and credit reporting is not communication with the consumer under that section.
- A § 1681s-2(b) claim requires allegations that the furnisher received notice under § 1681i(a)(2); conclusory allegations of an inadequate investigation did not suffice.
- Section 1681n supplies a remedy but is not itself a basis for a claim, and a Rosenthal Act claim resting on § 1788.17 needs more than a failed FDCPA theory.
- A pro se plaintiff who ignores a court-ordered amendment deadline risks a recommendation of dismissal for failure to prosecute, though this recommended dismissal is without prejudice and not yet adopted.
Why It Matters
This is a magistrate judge's unadopted findings and recommendations, not a district court ruling, and it carries little precedential weight beyond this case. Its main value is as an illustration of how an Eastern District of California court applies the pleading standard at screening to common consumer debt-collection theories, such as demands for assignment documents, accountings, and limitations proof.
Nothing is final until the district judge acts. Because the recommendation is for dismissal without prejudice, the merits are not conclusively resolved against Bell, but she has already been given, and did not use, an opportunity to amend.