Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Darwin Jose C.V. (the court uses an abbreviated surname) entered the United States around July 2022, was released on parole into the Alternatives to Detention program, and was released again on his own recognizance after a second arrest the next year. He worked as a cook and has no criminal history. On July 2, 2025, ICE arrested him when he reported as requested to his Intensive Supervision Appearance Program office, and he was later held at Adelanto and then California City.
Three bond proceedings followed. On September 30, 2025, an immigration judge denied bond for lack of jurisdiction. After a December 29, 2025 hearing, another denied bond, finding DHS had shown by clear and convincing evidence that no bond or alternative to detention could address flight risk. On January 12, 2026, an immigration judge denied bond a third time without taking evidence or argument, citing the prior finding. Petitioner says he never received notice of that hearing.
He then filed this habeas petition. The court had earlier denied a temporary restraining order because his motion lacked facts, evidence and argument, while finding prudential exhaustion unnecessary. By this order he had been detained over fifteen months, and an immigration judge had ordered him removed on August 3, 2026. His Board of Immigration Appeals appeal is pending. Respondents did not dispute the facts.
The Court’s Holding
The court rejected the argument that the TRO denial doomed the petition, explaining that the Winter preliminary-injunction test differs from the habeas standard and the earlier ruling did not prejudge the merits. It found a clear protected liberty interest: release on parole and recognizance carried an implicit promise against re-detention absent a violation, the record showed none, and he was detained while reporting as required after years of living and working here.
Under the Mathews v. Eldridge factors, his private interest was substantial, the risk of erroneous deprivation was high, and the government's interest in detaining him without notice or a proper hearing was low because such procedures are routine. The court reviewed all three bond decisions because the third incorporated the second. The first was not a custody hearing, the second was one conclusory paragraph, and the third issued without a hearing or evidence. None analyzed the In re Guerra factors or explained its reasoning. He therefore received neither notice nor a constitutionally compliant hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, violating the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
The court granted the petition and ordered immediate release with return of his documents and possessions. It enjoined re-detention while he is subject to section 1226(a) absent at least seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation hearing, with counsel, before a neutral factfinder, where the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that its public-safety or appearance interest outweighs his liberty interest and no alternative to detention can mitigate the risk. It denied two pending requests as moot and directed entry of judgment and closure of the case.
Key Takeaways
- A bond denial resting on conclusory flight-risk language, without analysis of the In re Guerra factors, did not satisfy due process here.
- A prior failed TRO motion does not foreclose a habeas petition, because the Winter test and the habeas standard differ.
- Release on parole or recognizance, no criminal history, and years living and working in the country strengthened the liberty interest the court recognized.
- The order is individual relief: it does not decide the removal order or the pending Board of Immigration Appeals appeal, and re-detention is barred only absent the stated notice and hearing protections.
Why It Matters
This is a district court release order in a single habeas case, and it is not a published or precedential opinion. Its reasoning applies Mathews to bond proceedings that were conclusory or held without a hearing, relying on Ninth Circuit and Eastern District authority such as Hernandez v. Sessions and Doe v. Becerra.
Its practical effect is limited to Petitioner: it leaves the removal order and appeal undisturbed, but it requires notice, an evidentiary hearing and a clear-and-convincing burden on the government before any re-detention under section 1226(a). Because the court treated the third denial as reflecting the second, the ruling also shows that courts may look at the full bond history rather than only the proceeding the petition challenges. Practitioners can cite it as persuasive on how courts assess repeated bond denials resting on earlier flight-risk findings.