California Case Summaries

Masood v. Blanche — Ninth Circuit Upholds Denial of Motion to Reopen Filed Over Four Years Late

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Masood v. Blanche
Court
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge
Silverman; Forrest; Vandyke
Date Decided
2026-10-28
Docket No.
12-71882
Status
Unreported
Topics
immigration, motion to reopen, untimely motion, changed country conditions, Board of Immigration Appeals, abuse of discretion, unpublished disposition

Background

Rana Muhammad Masood, a native and citizen of Pakistan, asked the Ninth Circuit to review an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. The panel's brief memorandum does not describe the original removal charge, the relief he previously sought, or the evidence he submitted with the motion. It records only that the motion was filed more than four years after the final removal order and that the court examined whether he had shown changed country conditions in Pakistan.

Federal law generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within ninety days of the final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). A late motion can still be considered under the exception for changed country conditions in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). Timeliness and that exception were the questions that decided the case.

The case was submitted without oral argument on October 27, 2026, to Circuit Judges Silverman, Forrest, and Vandyke, and the memorandum was filed on October 28, 2026. The court reviewed the denial of reopening for abuse of discretion, citing Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005), and stated that it had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. The disposition is marked not for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Masood also raised contentions about his credibility, which the panel did not decide.

The Court’s Holding

The court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen as untimely. Because the motion was filed over four years after the final removal order, it fell far outside the ninety-day period in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). The court further concluded that Masood did not show changed country conditions in Pakistan sufficient to qualify for the exception to the filing deadline in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

In support, the panel cited Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2010), where a petitioner's evidence lacked materiality because it simply recounted generalized conditions in the country of removal. The memorandum does not discuss Masood's particular evidence, so it does not reveal what documents he offered or exactly how they fell short beyond that comparison.

Having resolved the petition on timeliness, the panel said it need not reach Masood's remaining contentions regarding his credibility. It cited Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004), for the principle that courts and agencies are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results they reach. The court then denied the petition for review. That is a final disposition of this petition: the BIA's denial of reopening stands, and the memorandum grants no relief and orders no remand.

Key Takeaways

  • A motion to reopen removal proceedings generally must be filed within ninety days of the final removal order, and a motion filed more than four years afterward was untimely here.
  • A late motion can be saved only by an exception such as changed country conditions, and the petitioner must actually make that showing, which the court found Masood did not do.
  • Under Najmabadi, evidence that merely recounts generalized conditions in the country of removal lacks the materiality needed for the changed-conditions exception.
  • The BIA's denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion, a deferential standard that the petitioner did not overcome.
  • Because untimeliness was dispositive, the court did not decide Masood's credibility contentions, and the memorandum is unpublished and non-precedential under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Why It Matters

This is an unpublished memorandum, so it does not bind future panels and may be cited only as permitted by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Its value is as an illustration of how the court handles late motions to reopen: the ninety-day limit is applied as written, and the changed-conditions exception requires evidence that is material rather than a general description of conditions in the country of removal.

The decision leaves several matters open. It does not say what evidence Masood submitted, what reasoning the BIA gave, or whether his credibility arguments had merit. It does not discuss any other basis for reopening. Readers should treat it as a narrow denial of a petition for review, not as a ruling on the underlying removal case.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

Scroll to Top