Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Juan Jose Vasquez Barajas, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned the Ninth Circuit to review an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board had denied two requests: a motion to reopen his removal proceedings and a motion to reconsider and terminate them. Circuit Judges Silverman, Forrest, and Vandyke decided the case on the briefs, without oral argument, after granting the parties' joint motion to submit it that way. The disposition is an unpublished memorandum.
The Board treated the motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, meaning it was filed after the ordinary deadline and exceeded the permitted number of such motions. The motion to reconsider and terminate rested on the contention that the immigration judge lacked jurisdiction over the removal proceedings. The court treated that contention as one foreclosed by circuit precedent on notices to appear that omit hearing information. The memorandum does not describe the specific relief Vasquez Barajas sought on reopening, the new evidence he submitted, or the earlier history of his removal case, so this article does not characterize those matters.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the petition for review. It reviewed the denial of the motion to reopen and the motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion, citing Mohammed v. Gonzales, and stated that it has jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. On the motion to reopen, it held that the Board did not abuse its discretion because Vasquez Barajas failed to establish prima facie eligibility for relief. Quoting Bhasin v. Gonzales, the court explained that an applicant must show that new evidence, considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.
On the motion to reconsider and terminate, the court held that the Board did not abuse its discretion because the claim that the immigration judge lacked jurisdiction is foreclosed by the en banc decision in United States v. Bastide-Hernandez. As the panel summarized that decision, the absence of hearing information in a notice to appear does not deprive the immigration court of subject matter jurisdiction, and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) is satisfied when a later notice provides the hearing information.
The court added that Vasquez Barajas did not challenge the Board's denial of sua sponte reopening or reconsideration, so it did not address that part of the Board's decision, citing Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder. The petition was simply denied: the memorandum remands nothing, grants no relief, and leaves the Board's order in place.
Key Takeaways
- A motion to reopen described as untimely and number-barred failed here because the petitioner did not establish prima facie eligibility for relief, and the court found no abuse of discretion.
- Under the en banc Bastide-Hernandez decision as summarized by the panel, a notice to appear lacking hearing information does not deprive the immigration court of subject matter jurisdiction.
- The panel treated the requirement in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) as satisfied when a later notice supplies the hearing information.
- A jurisdictional argument foreclosed by binding en banc precedent cannot support reconsideration or termination of removal proceedings.
- Because the petitioner did not challenge the Board's refusal to reopen or reconsider on its own motion, the court did not address that ruling, and it remains unreviewed.
Why It Matters
The memorandum applies settled Ninth Circuit law rather than announcing a new rule. Its main value is as an example of how the court disposes of a jurisdictional challenge built on a notice to appear that lacked hearing information: it cites Bastide-Hernandez and ends the inquiry. It also illustrates that a noncitizen seeking reopening outside the time and number limits must still make a prima facie showing of eligibility for the relief sought.
Because the disposition is unpublished, it is not precedent except as allowed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, so it carries limited weight beyond this case. Its brevity also limits what can be drawn from it: the memorandum does not identify the relief at issue or the evidence submitted, and the unchallenged sua sponte ruling was left undisturbed without any statement on its merits. Practitioners should read it as a confirmation of existing authority, not as a source of new guidance on notices to appear or reopening standards.