Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Magdalena Gaspar-Mateo, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitioned the Ninth Circuit to review a Board of Immigration Appeals decision dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge's order denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. A footnote explains that the Board considered her application together with that of her minor daughter, whose claim is derivative of hers, although the petition names only Gaspar-Mateo. Gaspar-Mateo, an indigenous Guatemalan woman, said she fled and fears returning because she would be persecuted as a member of a proposed particular social group: indigenous Guatemalan women opposed to gender-based violence in a present machismo-based culture.
She testified that two men from her native town verbally and physically harassed her, including by repeatedly threatening to rape her or to kill her daughter. The immigration judge concluded that the men were private individuals engaging in criminal conduct. The Board affirmed, holding that the judge's findings regarding motive were not clearly erroneous. The panel of Judges M. Smith, Christen, and Miller decided the case without oral argument after submission on October 26, 2026, in a memorandum disposition marked not for publication.
The Court’s Holding
The court found jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Because the Board agreed with the immigration judge's reasoning, the court reviewed both decisions. It reviewed legal conclusions de novo and factual findings, including findings about a persecutor's motive, for substantial evidence, reversing only where the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.
On asylum and withholding, the court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Gaspar-Mateo did not link the harm she suffered or fears to a protected ground. Asylum requires that a protected ground be at least one central reason for the harm, and withholding requires that it be a reason, but the court noted that the distinction does not matter where there is no nexus at all. Her testimony did not compel the conclusion that the two men threatened her because she is an indigenous woman opposed to gender-based violence in Guatemala's machismo culture. A reasonable factfinder could conclude, as the agency did, that they were motivated by private criminal interests.
On the Convention Against Torture claim, the court explained that an applicant must prove torture is more likely than not upon removal, that a speculative fear does not suffice, and that generalized evidence of violence and crime is insufficient. Gaspar-Mateo relied on generalized reports about the prevalence of gender-based violence in Guatemala. The immigration judge found that evidence unpersuasive, the Board saw no clear factual error, and the record did not compel a contrary conclusion. The petition for review was denied.
Key Takeaways
- The panel affirmed the agency's finding that the harassers acted from private criminal motives, applying deferential substantial-evidence review to a factual question about motive.
- Because the court found no nexus to a protected ground, the difference between the asylum standard of at least one central reason and the withholding standard of a reason did not change the outcome.
- Generalized reports about the prevalence of gender-based violence in Guatemala, standing alone, did not compel a finding that torture was more likely than not for Convention Against Torture purposes.
- The memorandum does not decide whether the proposed social group of indigenous Guatemalan women opposed to gender-based violence is legally cognizable; it rests on the absence of a nexus.
- The disposition is not for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished memorandum, so it carries no precedential weight beyond Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, but it shows how the court applies settled authority on motive in claims involving private actors. A petitioner challenging a motive finding must show that the record compels a different conclusion, which is a demanding burden when threats are tied to apparent criminal aims rather than to the protected trait asserted.
The decision also illustrates the evidentiary gap in torture claims: country-conditions reports describing widespread violence do not substitute for evidence specific to the applicant. The ruling ends this petition and leaves the Board's order in place; the memorandum does not discuss what other avenues, if any, remain, such as a motion to reopen, and addresses the daughter's claim only by noting that it is derivative.