Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Sebastian Galindo-Martin, a Guatemalan national, flew to Florida on June 23, 2023, and was paroled into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) so he could apply for asylum. According to the order's account, he then applied for asylum, received a work permit, and attended his regular check-ins with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). On June 30, 2026, he went to a scheduled ICE check-in and was detained. He alleges that ICE did not tell him why he was being arrested. He was later transferred to the Otay Mesa Detention Center, where he awaits removal proceedings.
Proceeding without a lawyer, he filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on September 11, 2026. The court conditionally appointed the Federal Defenders, who filed an Amended Petition on September 29, 2026. It alleged that ICE acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking parole, that detention without process violated due process, and that the warrantless arrest violated statutory procedures under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). He asked for immediate release.
Respondents' October 7, 2026 return stated their position that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). It also acknowledged that courts in this district have consistently found that § 1226 applies to noncitizens already in the country. Respondents did not dispute that he had been released on parole, and they stated that the government does not oppose the petition and defers to the Court on appropriate relief. Petitioner filed a traverse on October 13, 2026.
The Court’s Holding
The court held that Petitioner's Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated when he was detained without notice or an opportunity to be heard. It reasoned that due process protects noncitizens within the United States whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent, and that a person who has passed through the nation's gates may be expelled only after proceedings meeting traditional standards of fairness. Respondents did not contest that Petitioner was paroled into the country in June 2023. The court therefore treated his release as creating what Pinchi v. Noem, a Northern District of California decision quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, calls an implicit promise that liberty would be revoked only if he failed to meet the conditions of release.
On the record before it, the court noted that ICE officers arrested Petitioner without any indication that his parole had been revoked and without notice or a chance to be heard. Respondents did not dispute the due process claim or the requested relief. The court granted the Amended Petition. It ordered Respondents to release Petitioner immediately, subject to the conditions of his existing parole. It also enjoined them from detaining him unless he is given notice of the reasons for revoking parole and a hearing to determine whether detention is warranted. The Clerk was directed to close the matter.
In a footnote, the court declined to reach the arbitrary-and-capricious and warrantless-arrest claims. The order also does not resolve whether § 1225(b)(2) or § 1226 governs his detention.
Key Takeaways
- The court found a Fifth Amendment due process violation where a paroled noncitizen was detained at an ICE check-in without notice of parole revocation or a hearing.
- The court relied on the reasoning that release on parole creates an implicit promise that liberty will be revoked only for failure to meet the conditions of release.
- The government did not oppose the petition and deferred to the court on relief, although its return still stated a position favoring mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).
- Relief consists of release on the existing parole conditions plus an injunction against detention without notice of the reasons and a hearing, so the order does not bar a later revocation made after that process.
- The court did not reach the arbitrary-and-capricious or warrantless-arrest claims, and the order is an unpublished single-judge ruling that does not bind other courts.
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished district court order issued on a largely unopposed record, so its precedential weight is limited. It is persuasive mainly as another example of a court applying parole-based due process reasoning, drawing on out-of-district authority such as Pinchi, to the detention of people previously paroled into the United States.
Significant questions remain open. Any removal proceedings continue, and the order does not prevent the government from seeking to revoke parole through notice and a hearing. It does not specify the form of the hearing, the decision-maker, or the standard to be applied, and it does not decide whether § 1225(b)(2) or § 1226 governs. Because the government deferred on relief, the scope of the injunction may reflect that posture.