Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Karla Coleman, proceeding without a lawyer, sued U.S. Bank National Association in the Eastern District of California solely in her representative capacity as Special Administrator of the Estate of Chinester Coleman, her father. The complaint seeks declaratory and equitable relief concerning a reverse-mortgage obligation executed by the decedent, with a deed of trust recorded in January 2006 naming him as trustor. Plaintiff alleges she was not the borrower, trustor, maker, or original obligor.
The complaint alleges that during probate proceedings the Estate tried to resolve the claimed obligation by tendering payment, conditioned on identifying who was entitled to enforce it and on an accurate accounting, but the tender was refused. It further alleges that a foreclosure sale occurred on August 14, 2025, and that a trustee's deed upon sale recorded on or about September 3, 2025 names U.S. Bank as grantee and foreclosing beneficiary. Plaintiff alleges the bank has not explained whether the $365,000 transaction was a cash bid, a credit bid, or another form of satisfaction, and she disputes the bank's right to possess the property. She asks for several declaratory judgments on the parties' respective rights. These are plaintiff's allegations, and the court made no findings on them.
Plaintiff also applied to proceed in forma pauperis and filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. Because of the fee-waiver request, the magistrate judge screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), accepting the factual allegations as true unless clearly baseless and applying the more lenient standard for pro se pleadings.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge Allison Claire granted the application to proceed in forma pauperis, which is an order. Everything else is a recommendation: that the motion for a temporary restraining order be denied, and that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice and the case closed. The matter is referred to District Judge Troy L. Nunley, and the recommended denial and dismissal are not final unless the district judge adopts them.
The reasoning is narrow. All of the claims belong to the Estate, not to plaintiff personally. Section 1654 lets parties conduct their own cases, but under Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2008), that privilege is personal to the litigant and does not extend to other parties or entities. The court described a general rule against pro se plaintiffs pursuing claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity. It said the rule reaches non-attorney executors, administrators, and personal representatives of a decedent's estate, relying on Simon's discussion of out-of-circuit authority. An estate's representative may litigate in federal court, but only through counsel, because only a licensed attorney may plead and prosecute the estate's claims. The complaint therefore must be dismissed and the request for a temporary restraining order denied. The court did not reach the merits of the reverse mortgage, the foreclosure, or the tender.
Pro se litigants are ordinarily given liberal leave to amend, but the court found amendment would be futile given the representation defect. The recommended dismissal is expressly without prejudice to the filing of a complaint by counsel. Plaintiff has 21 days after service to file written objections, and failure to object may waive the right to appeal the district court's order.
Key Takeaways
- A non-attorney special administrator, executor, or other personal representative cannot prosecute an estate's claims pro se in federal court; a licensed attorney must do so.
- The self-representation right in 28 U.S.C. § 1654 is personal to the litigant, so a plaintiff who sues only in a representative capacity cannot rely on it.
- This is a recommendation, not a final judgment: the district judge must decide whether to adopt it, and plaintiff may object within 21 days.
- The recommended dismissal is without prejudice to refiling by counsel, so the Estate's claims about the reverse mortgage, foreclosure, and tender remain undecided.
- Obtaining in forma pauperis status does not prevent screening dismissal, and the temporary restraining order request falls along with the complaint.
Why It Matters
This is a routine application of Ninth Circuit authority in a screening posture, but it shows how the representation rule can end a case before any substantive question is reached. As an unreported magistrate judge recommendation, it applies Simon v. Hartford Life rather than announcing new law and has no precedential weight.
Estate representatives considering a challenge to a foreclosure should retain counsel before filing, particularly when seeking urgent relief such as a temporary restraining order. The order does not address plaintiff's authority as special administrator or any timing or other obstacles to refiling, so those questions remain open.