Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Yefeng Wang, who represents himself, filed a Form I-485 to adjust status as an asylee on April 16, 2025, and a Form I-730 asylee relative petition for his spouse on May 30, 2025. He alleges both were still pending when he sued on June 11, 2026, longer than the fiscal year 2025 national median processing times of 10.3 months for the I-485 and about 10.9 months for the I-730. A service request and a congressional inquiry allegedly produced no movement. He alleges the delay limits his work authorization, including renewal of his commercial driver license, restricts business travel, strains his family, and exposes him and his spouse to risk of removal proceedings.
He sued the USCIS Director and the USCIS National Benefits Center under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Mandamus Act, asking for adjudication within 30 days. Defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). They argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) removes jurisdiction over the pace of discretionary adjustment decisions, citing Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuit decisions in reply. They also argued the complaint did not plausibly allege unreasonable delay, pointing to first-in, first-out processing and a posted 34.5-month processing time for asylee I-485 applications.
The Court’s Holding
Treating the jurisdictional attack as facial, the court held that section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar the claims. Wang did not contest that the ultimate decision to grant adjustment is discretionary; he sought only a decision. The court reasoned that the discretion in 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) concerns whether to grant adjustment, not whether to decide a properly presented application. The duty to act comes from the APA's command to conclude matters within a reasonable time, not from a regulation, so Poursina did not help Defendants. The court distinguished the out-of-circuit cases as visa-retrogression cases involving an affirmative hold policy, whereas Defendants identified no policy explaining the delay here. It acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit has not squarely decided the question and followed Northern District decisions. The same analysis applied to the I-730 petition under § 1158(b)(3)(A), and the Mandamus Act claim survived for the same reason.
On Rule 12(b)(6), the court weighed the TRAC factors and found the allegations sufficient, while stressing that success on the merits is far from established. The roughly fourteen- and twelve-month delays favored Defendants on the first factor, and the court took seriously the fourth factor's concern about displacing other applicants. The second factor did not favor Defendants because the applications had pended well beyond the 180 days described in 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b), though that statement is a congressional aspiration, not an enforceable deadline. The alleged harm to Wang's commercial-driving work and family bore on the third and fifth factors, and the sixth requires no bad faith. The court could not accept Defendants' processing-time figure or queue description for their truth on the pleadings. It distinguished Da Costa, Pimpalkhute, Gowda and other cited decisions, and disregarded new facts and exhibits first offered in the opposition.
The court did not find the delay unreasonable, set no adjudication deadline, and did not direct approval of either filing. It ordered Defendants to respond to the complaint within 14 days and to file a summary judgment motion within 60 days of their answer.
Key Takeaways
- Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not bar claims seeking a decision on an asylee-based I-485 or I-730, because the statutory discretion concerns whether to grant relief, not whether to decide.
- The out-of-circuit visa-retrogression decisions rested on an affirmative agency hold policy and were found inapplicable where no policy was shown.
- Delay of roughly twelve to fourteen months, beyond the 180-day statement in section 1571(b) and median processing times and coupled with alleged employment harm, was enough to plead unreasonable delay.
- This is only a denial of a motion to dismiss; whether the delay is actually unreasonable, and what relief is appropriate, remain open for summary judgment on an evidentiary record.
Why It Matters
The order adds to Northern District of California authority treating suits to compel adjudication as reviewable despite section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), while acknowledging the absence of controlling Ninth Circuit authority and contrary readings in other circuits. It is a non-precedential magistrate judge order.
It also shows how courts handle short delays at the pleading stage: the delay favored the government, but the lack of an evidentiary record on USCIS's claimed processing practice kept the claim alive. The practical effect is that the case proceeds to an answer and early summary judgment.