Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Michael Alard-Gonzalez is a Cuban citizen who entered the United States as a minor and became a lawful permanent resident. According to the magistrate judge's findings, he was convicted of an aggravated felony in 1996 and ordered removed in 1998. He was released from immigration custody on an order of supervision in June 2001. The petition alleges that he complied with supervision for over two decades and that on November 4, 2025, DHS officers took him into custody without a warrant or notice of revocation after summoning him to a police station. Those are allegations, not findings.
He filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition in June 2026, after an earlier petition in the Middle District of Florida was dismissed at his request. Respondents moved to dismiss under the first-to-file rule and said DHS continues to pursue removal to Cuba or, alternatively, Mexico. On September 23, 2026, the magistrate judge recommended denying the motion and granting the petition. The parties were warned that failing to object might waive the right to appeal, and no objections were filed.
The Court’s Holding
Conducting de novo review under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the district judge found the findings and recommendations supported by the record and proper analysis, adopted them in full, and granted the petition. The order is brief and relies on the magistrate judge's reasoning.
As the findings describe it, the first-to-file argument failed because the Florida petition had been dismissed. On the merits, the magistrate judge reasoned that the six-month presumption and burden-shifting framework of Zadvydas v. Davis does not govern a challenge to re-detention after release on supervision. Instead, 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(i) and 241.4(l) apply, and ICE must show changed circumstances making removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Respondents offered only a general statement about ongoing efforts and gave no details. Mexico accepts third-country removals only of people who consent, and Petitioner had refused consent. The magistrate judge found the burden unmet, concluded the re-detention was unlawful, and declined to reach the remaining claims.
The relief is specific. Respondents must immediately release Petitioner from DHS custody on the same conditions as his prior release. They are enjoined from re-detaining him under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) unless there are material changed circumstances and a neutral decisionmaker determines that removal is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. A footnote says the order does not bar re-detention for an additional six months under § 241.13(i)(1) if he violates his release terms. The Clerk was directed to serve the detention center and close the case. The order's injunction does not repeat the magistrate judge's alternative language about a pre-deprivation bond hearing.
Key Takeaways
- Under the adopted findings, re-detention of someone previously released on an order of supervision is tested under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), not the Zadvydas six-month framework.
- A general statement that DHS is pursuing removal, without supporting details, did not meet the government's burden to show changed circumstances.
- Removal to Mexico was not treated as reasonably foreseeable where the detainee refused to consent.
- The order grants release and closes the case, but it carves out re-detention for violations of release conditions and leaves open whether DHS could later show changed circumstances.
- This is a single district court order in an individual case and does not by itself create binding precedent.
Why It Matters
The order shows an Eastern District of California court enforcing DHS's own revocation regulations rather than reaching broader constitutional questions. The magistrate judge declined to address the petitioner's other claims after finding the regulatory violation. The findings also discuss a possible right to a pre-deprivation hearing under other district decisions, but the operative injunction in the order does not include that alternative.
The ruling is fact-bound and rests on a thin government showing. It does not decide the merits of the petitioner's pending immigration appeal or his removability. The absence of objections shaped the posture, and the court's warning that failing to object may waive appellate rights is a point for any later review. Whether DHS can later establish changed circumstances and obtain a neutral determination remains open.