Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Mohamed Younis Ali, a federal prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, petitioned the Central District of California for a writ of habeas corpus against the warden of FCI Victorville. He raised claims under the First Step Act (FSA) and the Second Chance Act (SCA). The relief he sought was an order requiring his release to a residential reentry center. Respondent moved to dismiss.
A magistrate judge recommended dismissing the petition without prejudice for several reasons. Ali had conceded he is not eligible for relief under the FSA, the SCA claim was not ripe, and he had not exhausted administrative remedies. Ali's objections focused almost entirely on exhaustion. He said he gave his informal and formal grievance forms to a counselor who never entered them into the Bureau of Prisons administrative remedy program, so remedies were unavailable to him. On November 2, 2026, the district judge accepted the report, and a one-page judgment of dismissal without prejudice was entered the same day.
The Court’s Holding
After reviewing de novo the portions of the report to which Ali objected, the district judge overruled the objections. The judge adopted the report, granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the action without prejudice. The judgment is brief and gives no reasons. The reasoning is in the separate order accepting the report.
The court did not decide whether Ali actually exhausted. It questioned the genuineness of a Bureau of Prisons memorandum he offered, noting grammatical errors and a legal conclusion unusual for such a document. It held that, regardless of exhaustion, the claims failed for other reasons. It also said Ali bore the burden of showing exhaustion should be excused, and that the record showed at most an exhaustion process begun but not completed, not one made unavailable.
On the merits-related grounds, the FSA claim failed because Ali conceded in his opposition that he was no longer disputing FSA credits. The SCA claim was not clearly stated even under liberal construction of the pro se petition, and it was not ripe. The court declined to resolve contingent future events that may not occur. The court also reasoned that it would have no authority under the SCA to order the Bureau of Prisons to place him in a residential reentry center, which was the only relief he sought. His arguments about the full record and equity were rejected on the same basis.
Key Takeaways
- A petitioner's concession in opposing a motion to dismiss can end a claim, as Ali's concession did for his First Step Act credit claim.
- A court may skip a disputed exhaustion question when independent grounds, here ripeness and the lack of available relief, require dismissal.
- A petitioner seeking to excuse exhaustion bears the burden of showing remedies were unavailable, and evidence of a started but unfinished grievance process does not meet it.
- Under the reasoning adopted here, a habeas court cannot order the Bureau of Prisons to place an inmate in a residential reentry center under the Second Chance Act.
- The dismissal is without prejudice, but the order does not say whether or how a renewed petition could cure the ripeness and relief problems.
Why It Matters
This is a district court judgment and order, not a published or precedential opinion. It binds only the parties and sets no rule for other courts. It is useful as an illustration of how a Central District judge handled a pro se petition seeking reentry-center placement.
The order shows how a court can resolve such a petition on grounds independent of exhaustion. It also leaves open whether Ali might later bring a properly framed and ripe claim after completing the administrative process. The without-prejudice dismissal does not itself decide that question.