Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Mikhail Ruslanov is an immigration detainee who challenges his continued detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. On August 8, 2026, he filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Eastern District of California, with a motion for a temporary restraining order. He contended that he should be released immediately because he had been detained longer than the six-month presumptively reasonable period, or alternatively receive another bond hearing. District Judge Jennifer L. Thurston denied the restraining order on August 12, 2026, noting that the request was in effect an attempt to jump the line ahead of similarly situated individuals. Ruslanov then moved for a preliminary injunction.
This was his second habeas case. He filed the first on February 14, 2026, and the court denied several emergency requests there. On May 15, 2026, the magistrate judge recommended denying the first petition, finding that the procedural due process factors favored the government and that there was no substantive due process violation. Ruslanov objected and filed supplemental objections, a supplemental brief and supporting documents asking the district judge to consider later events. Those objections remain pending before Judge Thurston. Respondents moved to dismiss the new petition as duplicative, contending that the prolonged-detention theory repackages the original claim and that the injunction motions recycle earlier medical, funds and legal-preparation complaints. The magistrate judge took judicial notice of the earlier case record.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge recommends that the district judge grant the motion to dismiss, dismiss the petition as duplicative and an abuse of the writ, and deny Ruslanov's pending motions (Docs. 10 and 17) as moot. This is a recommendation, not a final order or judgment. Parties have fourteen days to file objections, and the recommendation is not immediately appealable. The findings do not say whether dismissal would be with or without prejudice.
The statutory bar on successive petitions in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 does not apply to section 2241 petitions by people held pending immigration proceedings. The Ninth Circuit has nevertheless recognized that the common law abuse of the writ doctrine can apply to such petitions. The government must plead abuse with clarity and particularity, identifying the prior writ history and the claims appearing for the first time. The burden then shifts to the petitioner to show cause and prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A petitioner also has no right to maintain two actions on the same subject matter at the same time in the same court against the same defendant.
The magistrate judge found no new or different grounds. Because Ruslanov had asked the district judge in the first case to consider supplemental briefing on the same subject and sought to add the prolonged-detention claim there, the second petition was entirely duplicative of a first petition still awaiting final determination. The court quoted Ortega Nunez, another Eastern District recommendation, which found no miscarriage of justice from dismissal because the earlier case would address new bond arguments, and concluded the instant petition is an abuse of the writ. The findings do not separately analyze cause and prejudice and do not decide the merits of the prolonged-detention claim.
Key Takeaways
- A second section 2241 immigration detention petition may be recommended for dismissal as an abuse of the writ when an earlier petition on the same detention is still pending.
- Section 2244's successive-petition bar does not govern these petitions, but the common law abuse of the writ doctrine can.
- Under this recommendation, events after earlier findings, including a prolonged-detention theory, belong in the first case through supplemental filings.
- Because this is only a recommendation, Ruslanov may object within fourteen days, and the district judge must still act before any dismissal takes effect.
Why It Matters
The recommendation shows how Eastern District magistrate judges are handling repeat immigration habeas filings: by treating a new petition that repeats a pending case as an abuse of the writ rather than ruling on its merits. It also illustrates that a duplicative filing can lead to a dismissal recommendation while the earlier case remains open.
Its weight is limited. It is a magistrate judge's recommendation, not a binding ruling, and it rests on fact-specific procedural posture, including the pendency of the first petition. Whether the district judge adopts it, and how the first case is resolved on the prolonged-detention and due process questions, remains open.