Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner, a foreign national, entered the United States lawfully in 2014 on an F-1 student visa and stayed beyond the permitted period. The record is inconsistent about whether he is a citizen of Nigeria or Niger. ICE arrested him on September 12, 2025 as he left a county jail, charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for overstaying, and began removal proceedings. Those proceedings remain pending with no hearing scheduled.
Petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on February 23, 2026. After counsel was appointed, he amended it to allege that detention without a custody hearing violates Fifth Amendment due process and that detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) is unlawful. District Judge Dena Coggins converted his restraining-order motion into a preliminary injunction motion and, on April 6, 2026, granted it. She found he had not had an opportunity to contest the lawfulness of his detention.
Respondent argued that Petitioner is not an applicant for admission, but never identified the statutory authority for detaining him. It said he "may be bond hearing eligible" under § 1226(a) if an immigration judge decides his March 2025 conviction does not fall under § 1226(c)(1)(E). The only evidence of his two convictions was an unsigned Form I-213; Respondent offered no court records or FBI RAP sheet. When given the chance to file an answer, Respondent stood on the existing record.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge did not reach Petitioner's § 1225(b)(2) arguments because Respondent did not claim that provision governed, though she agreed § 1225 was not the proper authority. She found the record insufficient to show he was lawfully subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E). Respondent had not alleged that he is inadmissible under the grounds the provision requires, and he is charged only with a deportability ground. Respondent also did not explain how his 2025 conviction under California Penal Code § 602.5(a), which the court described as a trespass-related offense, meets the essential elements of burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or the other listed crimes. On this record, the only lawful statutory basis for detention would be § 1226(a).
On due process, the court noted that the Ninth Circuit has assumed without deciding that the Mathews v. Eldridge test applies, and applied it. It found a strong liberty interest and a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation. Petitioner received no notice of the basis for mandatory detention and no hearing to challenge it during roughly seven months in custody, and Respondent produced no Notice to Appear or other evidence of notice. The government's interests in removal and public safety would not be undercut by a hearing at which an immigration judge assesses flight risk and danger, and the administrative burden is low. The court called the violation clear and especially egregious.
The magistrate judge recommended granting the petition and permanently enjoining Respondent from detaining Petitioner unless he first receives adequate notice of the basis for detention and either (a) a hearing before a neutral arbiter or (b) he becomes subject to a final removal order with notice under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. The hearing must come with at least seven days' notice and allow counsel to be present. Respondent must show by clear and convincing evidence either a changed circumstance making Petitioner a danger or flight risk, or that he is lawfully subject to mandatory detention. Bond or supervised release must be considered unless mandatory detention is found. The recommendation would also bar added restrictions such as electronic monitoring unless a later hearing finds them necessary. Objections are due within seven days.
Key Takeaways
- Section 1226(c)(1)(E) mandatory detention requires both a listed inadmissibility ground and a listed criminal offense, and the court found the government had shown neither on this record.
- A visa overstayer charged only under the deportability provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), was not shown to meet the inadmissibility prerequisite for mandatory detention.
- An unsigned Form I-213 alone, with no court records or RAP sheet, did not substantiate the conviction the government relied on.
- The court held that months of detention without notice of the basis for mandatory detention or any chance to challenge it violated procedural due process.
- The decision is a recommendation, not a final order; it takes effect only if the district judge adopts it, and the court did not decide the § 1225(b)(2) claims.
Why It Matters
The report applies the Mathews factors to hold that the government must give notice of the basis for mandatory detention and a meaningful chance to contest it. It also shows that a vague reference to possible mandatory detention, with no developed statutory or evidentiary showing, will not justify holding someone without a hearing. Its proposed order sets out concrete protections: seven days' notice, counsel present, a clear and convincing evidence burden on the government, and consideration of bond or supervision.
As an unadopted magistrate judge recommendation from a federal trial court, it has no precedential weight and is persuasive at most. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify it after objections. It also rests heavily on gaps in this record, so a better-documented government showing could lead to a different result in another case.