Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Grigor Amalyan, a native of the former Soviet Union, became a lawful permanent resident in 1991. Between 2005 and 2023 he was convicted in California of several offenses, and in May 2023 he was convicted of assault with a firearm under Penal Code section 245(a)(2) and sentenced to five years. On March 24, 2026, when he left state custody, ICE took him into custody and served a Notice to Appear charging him as removable for an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Through counsel he petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that detention without an individualized custody hearing violated Fifth Amendment due process. He sought release or a hearing at which the government bears a clear-and-convincing burden, and he also asked the court to bar his transfer.
Respondents answered that Amalyan is held under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), as amended by the Laken Riley Act, and that detention of under six months without a final removal order is permissible. Amalyan did not dispute that the statute applies. Because his detention had passed six months, the court ordered supplemental briefing. While the petition was pending, an immigration judge held a custody hearing on September 28, 2026, found that the Department of Homeland Security proved by clear and convincing evidence that release would endanger the community, and denied bond. On October 6, 2026, the judge found him removable, denied asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protection, and ordered removal to Armenia. Amalyan reserved appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals, due October 28 and November 5, 2026, and the removal order is not administratively final.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the petition without prejudice. Taking as given that Amalyan is detained under section 1226(c), it applied Demore v. Kim, which upheld mandatory detention for the brief period needed for removal proceedings, and Justice Kennedy's concurrence recognizing that a lawful permanent resident may be entitled to an individualized determination if detention becomes unreasonable or unjustified. It noted that Jennings v. Rodriguez held the statute itself requires no periodic bond hearings and left the constitutional questions open. None of Amalyan's three arguments showed a due process violation.
First, the court did not decide whether Singh v. Holder required a clear-and-convincing hearing, because Amalyan had received exactly that hearing. Second, his argument that he was owed a hearing before detention, and that a later hearing could not cure the violation, relied on cases involving re-detention after release or detention after a final removal order. Neither fits: ICE first took him into custody when his sentence ended, and his removal order is not final. Third, his doubts about the burden of proof were unsupported because the immigration judge's order states that the government bore it, and disagreement with the danger finding goes to the outcome, which he may appeal, not to the process. He also failed to show detention had become unreasonable: he had a custody determination about six months in, a removal decision followed, and he identified no delay attributable to respondents. The transfer request and requests for a prompt ruling were denied as moot.
Key Takeaways
- The court did not decide whether due process requires a bond hearing for a detainee held under section 1226(c); it held that the hearing Amalyan received answered the relief he sought.
- Authorities involving re-detention after release, or detention under a final removal order, did not help a detainee first taken into custody at the end of a criminal sentence with a nonfinal removal order.
- Disagreement with an immigration judge's danger finding challenges the result of a hearing, not whether due process was provided, and the Board of Immigration Appeals appeal remains the avenue for that challenge.
- Because detention continues and its basis may change with the appeals, the denial is without prejudice rather than a final resolution of every future claim.
Why It Matters
This is a district court order by a magistrate judge sitting on consent, not a published opinion, and it carries no precedential weight. It is useful as an example of how a court may resolve a prolonged-detention challenge under section 1226(c) when an individualized hearing with the burden on the government has already occurred. The order does not announce a six-month rule; it rests on the record showing that a hearing occurred, that the burden was allocated to the government, and that no government-caused delay was shown. Future claims could differ if the appeals or the length of detention change the facts.