Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Branden Willie Iseli, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Eastern District of California, naming the San Joaquin County Jail as respondent. The case was referred to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302(c)(17).
On July 21, 2025, the magistrate judge ordered Iseli, within thirty days, either to file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis or to pay the required filing fee. The order warned that failure to do so would result in a recommendation that the petition be dismissed. According to the district judge's account, Iseli did not respond in any way within the time allowed.
On September 4, 2025, the magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations proposing dismissal without prejudice because Iseli had not paid the fee, filed the required documents, or otherwise responded to the court's order. The findings were served at his address of record with notice that objections were due within fourteen days. The district judge reports that no objections were filed and that the time to object had long passed. The order adopting the findings was signed on October 30, 2026, more than a year later, and a footnote apologizes for the delay, attributing it to an administrative oversight through which the judge only recently learned the findings were pending.
The Court’s Holding
Conducting the de novo review described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), Judge Dale A. Drozd reviewed the entire file and concluded that the findings and recommendations were supported by the record and by proper analysis. The decretal paragraphs adopt them in full, dismiss the action without prejudice, and direct the Clerk to close the case. The caption describes the order as adopting the findings 'in part,' but the body and operative paragraphs adopt them in full, and the docket entry likewise describes adoption in full.
The court also declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), it explained that when a petition is dismissed on procedural grounds, a certificate should issue only if jurists of reason would find it debatable both whether the procedural ruling was correct and whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). It concluded that reasonable jurists would not find the dismissal without prejudice debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further.
The order makes no finding on the merits of any claim, and it does not describe the petition's contents. The disposition rests solely on the failure to pay the fee or seek pauper status and to respond to the court's directive.
Key Takeaways
- A habeas petitioner who neither pays the filing fee nor seeks in forma pauperis status after a court order, and who does not respond at all, risks dismissal of the petition.
- The dismissal is without prejudice and is not a merits ruling, but the order does not address whether a later petition would be timely or otherwise procedurally permissible.
- The district judge adopted the findings after de novo review under § 636(b)(1)(C) because no objections were filed within the fourteen-day period, and the order includes a footnote apologizing for the delay in ruling.
- The district court itself denied a certificate of appealability under the Slack standard for procedural dismissals, and the order does not address any request made to the court of appeals.
- The caption's 'in part' language conflicts with the body and decretal paragraphs, which adopt the findings and recommendations in full, and the operative paragraphs describe what the court actually did.
Why It Matters
This is an unreported order of a single district judge and carries no precedential weight. It applies settled procedures rather than announcing new law. Its value is illustrative: it shows the typical sequence for an unrepresented prisoner in the Eastern District of California, from a deficiency order with a warning, to findings and recommendations, a fourteen-day objection window, de novo review, and closure of the case.
For litigants, the order shows that silence can be costly. A single failure to respond to a fee order ended this case, and the objection period passed without any filing. Because the dismissal is without prejudice, the order leaves open whether Iseli may file again, and it does not discuss limitation periods, exhaustion, or any claim in the petition. Any future filing would have to satisfy the fee or pauper requirement and stand on its own terms. The delay of more than a year between the findings and their adoption is also notable, though the order offers only the administrative-oversight explanation.