California Case Summaries

Fenton v. General Motors LLC — Federal Court Denies Remand of Song-Beverly Lemon Law Case, Finding Removal Timely and Over $75,000 at Stake

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Fenton v. General Motors LLC
Court
U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
Judge
Dena Coggins (Joseph R. Biden Jr., 2024)
Date Decided
2026-10-13
Docket No.
2:25-cv-03414
Status
Unreported
Topics
removal, remand, diversity jurisdiction, amount in controversy, Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, civil penalties, 28 U.S.C. 1446(b), other paper

Background

Plaintiff Haley Alyse Fenton alleges that she bought a 2024 Chevrolet Tahoe on or around June 1, 2024, and that it developed engine defects that made it nonconforming with General Motors LLC's express and implied warranties. She alleges she delivered the vehicle for repair or replacement and that GM failed to conform it or to comply with California law. She pleaded four causes of action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act in Solano County Superior Court on October 21, 2025. These are allegations, and the order makes no findings on them.

GM answered in state court on November 21, 2025, and removed on November 24, 2025, on diversity grounds. Fenton moved to remand on December 22, 2025. She argued that removal was untimely and that GM had not shown more than $75,000 in controversy. On timeliness, she contended the complaint's vehicle details put GM on notice from service. She also contended that her September 25, 2025 production of the sales contract and repair history started a second 30-day clock that expired October 27, 2025. GM responded that her citizenship and the amount in controversy could not be determined from the complaint and that it removed after its own investigation. Complete diversity of citizenship was not disputed, and the motion was decided on the papers.

The Court’s Holding

The court, in an order signed by Judge Dena Coggins, denied the motion to remand. The first 30-day period under 1446(b) was not triggered because the complaint alleged only that Fenton resides in Linden, California, and said nothing about her domicile or citizenship. Removability was therefore not apparent on the face of the complaint. The second period was not triggered because, under Ninth Circuit authority (Carvalho), a document received before the initial pleading cannot be an other paper. The September 25, 2025 production came before the October 21 complaint. Because neither period applied and GM removed within one year of the complaint's filing, removal based on its own information was timely under Roth.

On the amount in controversy, GM bore the burden by a preponderance of the evidence. It relied on the sales contract and repair history to estimate actual damages of $69,496.81 under the Act's cash-price and mileage-offset method. The court found that GM did account for the statutory mileage offset and that Fenton offered no alternative calculation. It accepted GM's figure as actual damages of at least that amount.

Because Fenton alleged willful conduct and asked for a civil penalty of twice her actual damages, the court counted potential penalties of up to $138,993.62 under Civil Code section 1794(c). That produced a total of $208,490.43, one cent below GM's own figure because of arithmetic. The total exceeds $75,000, so the court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332. It did not reach the attorneys' fees arguments. The order directs the parties to file a joint status report on scheduling within 30 days.

Key Takeaways

  • A complaint that pleads only a plaintiff's residency, not domicile or citizenship, did not make the case removable on its face, so the first 30-day removal period was not triggered.
  • Under Carvalho, a document received before the initial pleading cannot be an other paper that starts the second 30-day period, so Fenton's pre-suit production of the sales contract did not start the clock.
  • Where neither 30-day period applies, a defendant may remove within one year of the complaint's filing on the basis of its own investigation, as the court applied Roth.
  • The court counted potential Song-Beverly civil penalties at twice actual damages in the amount in controversy because the complaint alleged willfulness and prayed for that penalty.
  • The ruling concerns only the forum. It decides nothing about whether the vehicle was defective or whether GM violated the Act.

Why It Matters

This is an unreported district court order applying existing Ninth Circuit removal rules. It binds no other court and is persuasive at most. It follows other Eastern District decisions it cites, including Gomez, Babekian, Wario and Midile, in lemon law cases removed by GM.

Practically, plaintiffs seeking remand in such cases face difficulty when the complaint pleads only residency and the claimed trigger predates the filing. A plaintiff who disputes a defendant's damages estimate should offer her own calculation, since the court noted Fenton did not. The remand denial is an interlocutory ruling. The case continues in federal court, and the merits remain undecided.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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