Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Lorrie Elmer Mecham appealed a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, entered with Judge David C. Nye presiding, that revoked his supervised release and imposed a sentence of 3 months' imprisonment. The Ninth Circuit resolved the appeal in an unpublished memorandum filed November 3, 2026, after submission on October 27, 2026, with the panel unanimously concluding that the case was suitable for decision without oral argument. Jurisdiction rested on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The argument the panel addressed was that the district court abused its discretion by revoking supervised release without considering whether revocation was appropriate under U.S.S.G. § 7C1.3(b). That provision appears in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which addresses violations of probation and supervised release. The memorandum does not describe the conduct that led to the revocation proceeding or the original offense, so this article does not characterize either.
According to the memorandum, Mecham cited the updated Chapter 7 policy statements in his sentencing papers and again at the revocation hearing, and he argued for ordering individualized treatment rather than revoking supervision. The district court considered that argument but disagreed. It elected to revoke and concluded that there was no reason to go "lower than the end" of the undisputed Guidelines range, given testimony establishing that Mecham was unwilling to engage in treatment.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Reviewing for abuse of discretion and citing United States v. Hilger, 728 F.3d 947, 951 (9th Cir. 2013), the panel concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to revoke supervised release.
The panel rejected Mecham's contention that the district court had failed to consider whether revocation was appropriate. Because Mecham himself had raised the Chapter 7 policy statements and the treatment alternative, and because the district court heard that argument and expressly disagreed with it, the record showed that the court had conducted an individualized assessment of whether to revoke supervised release under § 7C1.3(b). The court's stated reasons were the testimony establishing Mecham's unwillingness to engage in treatment and the undisputed Guidelines range, which the court saw no reason to go below.
The affirmance leaves both the revocation and the 3-month term of imprisonment in place, and nothing was remanded. The memorandum is brief. It does not set out a checklist for what an individualized assessment requires, does not decide how the Chapter 7 policy statements apply on a different record, and does not separately analyze the length of the sentence beyond affirming the judgment. Because the disposition is not for publication, it is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Key Takeaways
- A district court that hears a defendant's request for individualized treatment in place of revocation, and then rejects it, can satisfy the individualized assessment contemplated by U.S.S.G. § 7C1.3(b), according to this memorandum.
- Raising the updated Chapter 7 policy statements in sentencing papers and at the hearing shows the court had the argument before it; here, that same record undercut the claim that the court never considered revocation under § 7C1.3(b).
- Testimony that a defendant is unwilling to engage in treatment can supply a record-based reason for a court to choose revocation over continued supervision with treatment, at least where the court relies on it as the district court did here.
- The decision to revoke is reviewed for abuse of discretion, a deferential standard that the Ninth Circuit applied here by citing Hilger.
- This is an unpublished, non-precedential memorandum that may be cited only as Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 allows, and it does not announce a new rule about § 7C1.3(b).
Why It Matters
The memorandum is a modest but useful illustration of how the Ninth Circuit approaches a challenge that a district court ignored the Sentencing Commission's updated Chapter 7 guidance. The panel looked at what happened in the district court: the defendant invoked the policy statements, the court engaged with the request for treatment, and the court gave a reason grounded in testimony for choosing revocation. On that record, the claim that no real assessment occurred failed.
Its reach is limited. It is unpublished, it turns on a short record described in only a few sentences, and it does not address a case in which the defendant never raised § 7C1.3(b) or in which the court said nothing about treatment. Defendants challenging revocations and the government defending them should therefore read it as an application of settled abuse-of-discretion review, not as new authority.