Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Jorge M.C. (identified by initials in the order to protect personal information) is a noncitizen who, according to the record, entered the United States without admission in January 2022. Immigration authorities detained and later released him, and he lived in the United States for roughly five years. He alleged that on August 8, 2026, immigration authorities re-detained him without notice or a hearing and that he then spent two months in custody without any custody hearing. He further asserted that the government refused to provide a bond hearing or release him, and he claimed that this civil immigration detention violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of California against the warden of the California City Detention Center. The court had earlier granted his motion for a temporary restraining order, ordered his immediate release, and directed Respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted and judgment entered for him. Respondent rested on the existing record. Respondent had detained him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), yet acknowledged that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is the governing authority and that he was entitled to a custody hearing, citing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock. No hearing was provided or scheduled, and Respondent did not refute his assertion that a bond hearing was refused.
The Court’s Holding
Chief District Judge Troy L. Nunley granted the petition in a short final order following the earlier restraining order. The court found that Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in his continued freedom, which he developed during the years he lived freely in the country before his recent detention. That interest remains protected by the Due Process Clause even if he is subject to removal or his freedom could be revoked by statute, citing Hernandez v. Sessions and Zadvydas v. Davis.
Weighing the three Mathews v. Eldridge factors, and relying on the reasoning of its earlier restraining order and a similar Eastern District decision, the court found Petitioner was owed notice and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to determine whether his detention was justified. Because he received neither, the detention violated the Fifth Amendment. The order does not address the merits of any removal proceedings.
The relief is a grant of the petition, entry of judgment for Petitioner, and closure of the case. Respondent is enjoined from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner while he is subject to § 1226(a) unless statutory and constitutional protections are met. Those include at least seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral factfinder. At that hearing the government must show by clear and convincing evidence that its interest in protecting the public or ensuring his appearance outweighs his liberty interest, such that no alternative to detention can mitigate flight risk. Petitioner may have counsel present.
Key Takeaways
- The court treated years of living freely in the United States after an earlier release as creating a protected liberty interest, even though the person may be subject to removal.
- Respondent detained Petitioner under § 1225(b)(2) while acknowledging that § 1226(a) governed and entitled him to a custody hearing, and no hearing was provided or scheduled during two months of detention.
- The court found a Fifth Amendment violation under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test because Petitioner received neither notice nor a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.
- The injunction is prospective and limited to re-arrest or re-detention while Petitioner is subject to § 1226(a). It requires seven days' notice, a pre-deprivation hearing, the right to counsel, and a government showing by clear and convincing evidence that no alternative to detention can mitigate flight risk.
- The order rests partly on the unrefuted nature of Petitioner's allegation that a bond hearing was refused, since Respondent rested on the record rather than contesting it.
Why It Matters
This is a district court order, reported as unpublished, so it is persuasive rather than binding. It nonetheless shows how one Eastern District judge is applying the Mathews framework to people re-detained after a period of release, and it follows the same judge's reasoning in an earlier case cited in the order. The order also illustrates that a government concession that the correct detention statute entitled a person to a hearing does not by itself cure a due process violation already suffered.
The practical effect is limited to this Petitioner. The order sets demanding conditions for any future re-detention, including a heightened clear-and-convincing burden on the government, but it does not decide the merits of removal. Much of the Mathews analysis is incorporated from the earlier restraining order, which is not part of the materials reviewed here, so the full reasoning on each factor is not set out in this order.