Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Kerwin Jesus Gonzalez-Humbria, a Venezuelan citizen proceeding without counsel, was released into the United States by immigration officials in July 2024. On the facts the court found from the parties' briefing, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents arrested him in New York on or about June 4, 2026, after a traffic stop. On June 16, 2026, an immigration judge ordered him removed to Ecuador. The court's review of that order showed no grant of withholding or deferral of removal to any other country. Petitioner reserved the right to appeal, and the deadline was July 15, 2026. It is undisputed that he did not appeal by that date.
On August 24, 2026, he filed a habeas petition in the Eastern District of California with motions to proceed in forma pauperis, for a temporary restraining order, and to appoint counsel. The petition challenged his detention as prolonged and argued that his removal did not appear reasonably foreseeable. He alleged he could not appeal because the first detention center holding him was under quarantine and he could not communicate with anyone outside.
On August 25, the court set briefing on the restraining-order motion and directed the government to address whether anything distinguished the case from several of the court's earlier decisions. It also temporarily barred petitioner's transfer or removal to preserve the status quo. Respondent opposed, arguing petitioner was within the 90-day mandatory detention period because his removal order became final when he did not timely appeal. On September 16, respondent moved to dissolve the temporary bar, representing that the government had secured travel documents for his removal.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the petition without prejudice to renewal if his detention were to become prolonged. Because the evidence showed petitioner was subject to a final removal order, the court incorporated and adopted the reasoning of its earlier order in Balza Coronel v. Warden, California City Detention Center (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2026). There it had denied a habeas petition without prejudice because the removal order became final when the petitioner failed to timely appeal, leaving him subject to mandatory detention during the 90-day removal period.
A footnote addressed the quarantine allegation. The court observed that petitioner did not argue his removal proceedings were unfair and did not generally dispute that the order was final. Most importantly, he had not moved to reopen his removal proceedings under 8 C.F.R. section 1003.23. His petition challenged only the claimed prolongation of detention and the foreseeability of removal.
The court denied the in forma pauperis, temporary restraining order and appointment-of-counsel motions as moot. It granted respondent's motion to dissolve and lifted the earlier prohibition on transferring petitioner out of the district or removing him from the United States. The clerk was directed to close the case. The order does not decide any future claim that detention has become unlawfully prolonged or that removal is not reasonably foreseeable.
Key Takeaways
- A removal order can become final when the noncitizen does not appeal by the deadline, and this court treated that as placing him in mandatory detention during the 90-day removal period.
- A petitioner's allegation that detention-center quarantine prevented an appeal did not change the outcome where he did not dispute finality and had not moved to reopen his removal proceedings.
- Denial was without prejudice, so petitioner may renew his challenge if detention becomes prolonged.
- Once the petition was denied, the court treated the pending motions for in forma pauperis status, a temporary restraining order and appointed counsel as moot.
- The court lifted its status-quo order against transfer or removal, which left the government free to carry out removal after the government represented it had obtained travel documents.
Why It Matters
This is a short, unreported district court order that largely rests on the court's own earlier decision. It carries no binding precedential weight, but it shows how this court is handling habeas petitions from people who say they are detained after an unappealed removal order, particularly where the government answers with a finality-based opposition.
The practical lesson is that a petitioner who wants to contest finality should pursue the proper route, such as a motion to reopen under the regulation the court cited, rather than rely only on a prolonged-detention theory. Because the dismissal preserves renewal, the order does not foreclose a later claim, but the court's lifting of the transfer and removal bar means petitioner may be removed before any renewed challenge is heard.