Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Odson Laguerre, a citizen of Haiti, entered the United States at the Hidalgo, Texas port of entry on June 9, 2024, without valid entry documents. He was issued a Notice to Appear charging inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and granted humanitarian parole for 24 months under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). On October 19, 2024, Laguerre was arrested in Broward County, Florida, on state criminal charges of sexual battery and sexual assault with a weapon. An immigration detainer was lodged the following day.
The state criminal charges were dismissed via nolle prosequi on April 6, 2026, and ICE took Laguerre into custody on April 7, 2026, executing an arrest warrant. An immigration judge ordered Laguerre removed to Haiti on July 14, 2026; Laguerre has appealed that order, which remains pending. Laguerre filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on July 10, 2026, challenging his continued detention without notice or an individualized bond hearing. Respondent opposed, arguing Laguerre is an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) due to his humanitarian parole status, but acknowledged the Court typically orders bond hearings in such cases and requested 14 days to conduct one if § 1226 applied.
The Court’s Holding
The Magistrate Judge recommends granting the habeas petition and denying the motion for a temporary restraining order as moot. The Court finds Laguerre’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) because his humanitarian parole did not constitute an admission and, upon termination, he reverted to his pre-parole mandatory detention status under the “entry fiction” doctrine. The Court further finds his parole was properly terminated on April 7, 2026, when the arrest warrant was served, constituting a “charging document” under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i) that initiated removal proceedings. However, the Court holds that Thuraissigiam v.
Department of Homeland Security does not foreclose Laguerre’s as-applied due process challenge to his detention, distinguishing admission from detention. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge factors, the magistrate judge found Laguerre possesses a protected liberty interest in freedom from detention—reinforced by the government’s prior determination that he posed no flight or danger risk when granting parole—and that the risk of erroneous deprivation is high absent a hearing, while the government’s interest in detention without a hearing is low. Accordingly, Laguerre is entitled to a post-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker within seven days, at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is a flight risk or danger to the community. The Court orders specific procedural safeguards, including 72 hours’ written notice in a language Laguerre understands, the right to counsel, consideration of financial circumstances in setting bond, and release if the hearing is not held within seven days.
Key Takeaways
- Humanitarian parole does not constitute an admission; upon termination, the noncitizen reverts to pre-parole detention status under § 1225(b) (the “entry fiction”).
- An arrest warrant served on a previously issued Notice to Appear can constitute a “charging document” terminating humanitarian parole under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), even if not explicitly listed in 8 C.F.R. § 244.1.
- Thuraissigiam’s limitation on due process rights for noncitizens subject to the entry fiction applies only to admission decisions, not to detention challenges; as-applied due process challenges to mandatory detention under § 1225(b) remain viable.
- A noncitizen granted humanitarian parole retains a protected liberty interest in freedom from detention; the government bears the burden of proving flight risk or danger by clear and convincing evidence at a bond hearing following re-detention.
- Where ICE lodged a detainer promptly upon arrest and the criminal charges were dismissed, a post-deprivation (rather than pre-deprivation) bond hearing satisfies due process.
Why It Matters
This recommendation reinforces the distinction between admission and detention in immigration law, holding that Thuraissigiam does not bar due process challenges to prolonged mandatory detention under § 1225(b) for individuals previously granted humanitarian parole. It clarifies that the government’s initial parole determination—finding no flight or danger risk—creates a liberty interest that cannot be extinguished without procedural safeguards. If adopted, the recommendation would require a prompt bond hearing with a heightened burden of proof (clear and convincing evidence) on the government, and imposes specific procedural requirements including notice, right to counsel, and consideration of financial circumstances. The decision aligns with a growing line of district court cases in the Ninth Circuit recognizing bond hearing rights for parole-terminated detainees, and may influence pending appeals on the scope of Thuraissigiam and the entry fiction doctrine.
The recommendation contains important timing details. The proposed order would require a hearing within seven days, seventy-two hours’ written notice in a language Laguerre understands, an opportunity for counsel, and consideration of ability to pay and nonfinancial release conditions. If the government failed to hold the hearing on time, release would follow. The parties, however, retained a seven-day period to object to the recommendation before the assigned district judge acted. Practitioners should therefore describe this document as recommended relief and distinguish the proposed hearing remedy from an immediate final release order.