Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Plaintiff Jeremy Jones, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint on February 20, 2026, alleging constitutional violations by correctional officers M. Ayon and H. Ayon at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison, Corcoran. The complaint alleges that in December 2015, during a facility lockdown, Officer H. Ayon denied Jones a shower for five days due to a marital dispute with Officer M. Ayon. When Jones complained, the officers retaliated by conducting a destructive cell search, fabricating a rules violation for alcohol possession, and destroying his property. Approximately one year later, after Jones was transferred back to the facility, Officer M. Ayon allegedly retaliated further by searching his cell, failing to pack medical supplies during a transfer to administrative segregation, and discarding a box of legal materials, food, and cosmetics. Sergeant Castellic allegedly coerced Jones into signing an incomplete inventory sheet under duress. The Court screened the complaint on July 21, 2026, and issued an order to show cause why the action should not be dismissed as time-barred. Jones responded on September 17, 2026, arguing for tolling based on a "four-year" rule for prisoners and coexisting disabilities (wheelchair confinement, mental health program participation, migraines). The Court also noted a prior related case, Jones v. Ayon, 1:21-cv-00809-JLT-SAB, which Jones voluntarily dismissed without prejudice in October 2024. The reviewed document is the court’s signed ruling, and the procedural posture matters: recommendations remain subject to district-judge review, while an order granting the petition has immediate operative effect according to its terms.
The Court’s Holding
The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissal of the action as barred by the two-year statute of limitations under California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1, as borrowed for § 1983 claims. The claims accrued in 2015–2016 when Jones knew of the injuries. Even with the maximum two-year tolling for incarceration under § 352.1(a) (applicable to terms less than life), the filing deadline expired in 2020. The complaint was filed in February 2026, well outside the limitations period. The Court rejected Jones's tolling arguments: (1) the prior voluntary dismissal did not toll the statute (Wood v. Elling Corp.); (2) equitable tolling under the Bollinger rule requires diligent pursuit, lack of a judicial forum due to external forces, and no prejudice to defendants—none of which were satisfied because the prior dismissal was voluntary and at Jones's request; (3) § 358 tolling for "coexisting disabilities" applies only to statutory disabilities such as minority, imprisonment, or war, not to physical or medical conditions like wheelchair use, mental health status, or migraines; and (4) Jones's reliance on a "Prisoners Handbook" four-year guideline was conclusory and legally insufficient. The Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned District Judge; Jones has 14 days to file objections not exceeding 15 pages. The ruling is confined to the claims and record before the court. It does not decide issues the court expressly left open, and it should not be read as granting relief broader than the numbered disposition.
Key Takeaways
- Section 1983 claims in California are subject to a two-year statute of limitations (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1), tolled up to two additional years for incarceration on a term less than life (§ 352.1(a)).
- A voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not toll the statute of limitations; successive filings and dismissals cannot indefinitely extend the limitations period.
- Equitable tolling under the Bollinger rule requires: (1) diligent pursuit of the claim, (2) absence of a judicial forum due to forces outside plaintiff's control, and (3) no prejudice to the defendant—all three factors must be met.
- California Code of Civil Procedure § 358's "coexisting disabilities" tolling applies only to enumerated legal disabilities (minority, imprisonment, war), not to medical or physical impairments.
- At the screening stage under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a court may dismiss a time-barred claim sua sponte when the expiration is apparent on the face of the complaint.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the strict application of statute-of-limitations bars in prisoner § 1983 actions at the screening stage. It clarifies that neither voluntary dismissal of a prior suit nor a prisoner's medical conditions constitute grounds for equitable or statutory tolling beyond the two-year incarceration tolling provided by § 352.1(a). The ruling also underscores that pro se litigants' reliance on informal prison handbooks or misinterpretations of tolling statutes will not save untimely filings. The case illustrates the procedural hurdle of the Bollinger rule's three-factor test and the narrow scope of § 358 disabilities, providing a clear precedent for dismissing stale claims where the limitations period expired years before filing. Practitioners should track the precise statutory custody provision, the process already afforded, and whether the ruling is a final order or a magistrate judge’s recommendation. Those details determine both immediate compliance obligations and the next available review step.