California Case Summaries

Estate of Yates v. County of Sacramento — Aunt Appointed Guardian Ad Litem for Two Minors; Fee Review Deferred

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Estate of Yates v. County of Sacramento
Court
U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
Judge
Dena Coggins (Joseph R. Biden Jr., 2024)
Date Decided
2026-10-28
Docket No.
2:26-cv-02305
Status
Unreported
Topics
civil procedure

Background

This civil action was filed on behalf of the Estate of Katrina Zane Lee Yates and minor plaintiffs A.Y. and K.Y. against the County of Sacramento and other defendants. Because A.Y. and K.Y. are minors, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) and Eastern District of California Local Rule 202(a) require the appointment of a guardian ad litem or a showing that such appointment is unnecessary to ensure adequate representation. Non-party Brittany Ducioame-Strong, the biological aunt of A.Y. and K.Y., filed motions (Doc.

Nos. 2 and 5) seeking appointment as guardian ad litem for both minors. No oppositions were filed. In support, Ducioame-Strong declared she has no foreseeable interests adverse to the minors. Plaintiffs’ counsel disclosed a contingency fee arrangement entered into on May 25, 2025, with Ducioame-Strong (identified in the fee disclosure as Brittany Ducioame-Smith), confirming counsel was not retained at the instance of any defendant, has no relationship with any defendant, and has received no compensation to date but expects a percentage of any recovery (33.33% pre-suit, 40% after filing or mediation, 45% after one year of litigation).

The Court’s Holding

The court granted the motions and appointed Brittany Ducioame-Strong as guardian ad litem for minor plaintiffs A.Y. and K.Y., authorizing her to prosecute the action on their behalf. The court found Ducioame-Strong to be an appropriate guardian ad litem under Rule 17(c) and Ninth Circuit precedent, noting she is a biological aunt with no adverse interests and is dedicated to the minors’ best interests.

The court also found the requirements of Local Rule 202(a) and 202(c) satisfied based on the declarations and counsel’s fee disclosures. The court expressly declined to rule on the reasonableness of the contingency fee arrangement—which exceeds the district’s typical 25% benchmark for minor cases—stating that issue need not be resolved at the appointment stage.

Key Takeaways

  • The court appointed the minors’ biological aunt, Brittany Ducioame-Strong, as guardian ad litem after finding she has no adverse interests and is dedicated to the minors’ best interests.
  • No opposition was filed to the guardianship motions.
  • Plaintiffs’ counsel disclosed a contingency fee agreement with escalating percentages (33.33%/40%/45%) that exceeds the Eastern District’s typical 25% benchmark for minor cases (citing Robles v. Riano).
  • The court deferred any ruling on the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, consistent with precedent holding that fee reasonableness need not be resolved at the guardian ad litem appointment stage (citing J.A. v. County of Madera).
  • The appointment satisfies both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) and Eastern District Local Rule 202(a) and (c).

Why It Matters

The ruling illustrates the distinct inquiries in appointing a guardian and later reviewing compensation from a minor’s recovery. The aunt’s lack of adverse interests supported her appointment for both children. Disclosure of an escalating contingency arrangement satisfied the present procedural requirement but did not establish that the eventual fee would be reasonable. That question remains for later judicial review.

The motions concerned A.Y. and K.Y. separately, but the same biological aunt sought to represent both children. No opposition was filed, and her declaration disclosed no foreseeable conflict with either minor. Counsel’s declaration supplied the information required by the local rule, including the escalating contingent percentages and lack of ties to defendants. The court acknowledged that the arrangement exceeded a commonly used benchmark without deciding whether the percentages could ultimately be charged against any recovery belonging to the children.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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