California Case Summaries

Morales Camacho v. Casey — Court Orders Release Where Removal to Cuba Is Not Reasonably Foreseeable

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Morales Camacho v. Casey
Court
U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
Judge
Cynthia Bashant (Barack Obama, 2014)
Date Decided
2026-10-13
Docket No.
3:26-cv-05247
Status
Unreported
Topics
immigration, constitutional law

Background

Petitioner Luis Emanuel Morales Camacho, a non-citizen subject to a final order of removal to Cuba dated June 2, 2021, was released under ICE supervision because removal to Cuba was not practicable at the time. On July 6, 2026, ICE re-detained him. Morales Camacho filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his continued detention violated Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), which limits post-removal-order detention to a period reasonably necessary to effect removal. The Government filed a non-opposition, stating it could not establish a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future and acknowledging Petitioner’s entitlement to release under supervision. Petitioner filed a Traverse seeking additional judicial restrictions on ICE’s authority to re-detain him in the future.

The Court’s Holding

The Court granted the Amended Petition and ordered Petitioner’s immediate release from immigration custody under standard supervision conditions authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3). The Court declined to impose the additional prospective restrictions on future re-detentions requested in the Traverse, presuming ICE will comply with the law and Constitution, but preserved Petitioner’s right to re-raise the issue if ICE fails to do so.

The Court did impose one specific restriction: DHS is ordered not to remove Petitioner to any country other than Cuba without providing him notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the proposed removal to that third country. The Clerk was directed to close the case.

Key Takeaways

  • The Government conceded it could not demonstrate a significant likelihood of removal to Cuba in the reasonably foreseeable future, triggering the Zadvydas release requirement.
  • The Court ordered immediate release under standard statutory supervision conditions (8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3)) rather than unconditional release.
  • The Court refused to issue a broad injunction restricting future ICE detention authority, citing a presumption of executive compliance with the law, but left the door open for future habeas petitions.
  • The Court affirmatively ordered that Petitioner cannot be removed to a third country without notice and an opportunity to be heard, protecting against removal to a country not designated in the original order.
  • The case was closed upon entry of the writ.

Why It Matters

The order provides immediate relief under Zadvydas when the government cannot show a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. But it does not immunize the petitioner from every future lawful detention. The court declined broader prospective limits while requiring notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard before any attempted removal to a country other than Cuba.

Morales Camacho had a final removal order to Cuba but had previously been released because removal was not practicable. After ICE detained him again in July 2026, the government did not oppose habeas relief and conceded that it could not establish a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Release remained subject to the ordinary supervision conditions authorized by statute. The narrower third-country protection responded to a distinct concern while leaving lawful future detention questions open. The operative relief was carefully bounded. ICE had to release him immediately under supervision, and DHS could not send him to a third country without notice and a reasonable chance to address that destination. The court did not grant the broader request to prescribe conditions for every possible future re-detention, explaining that a later violation could be raised if it actually occurred.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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