Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Following a jury trial in the District of Montana before Senior District Judge Susan P. Watters, Moises Zamora was convicted of possessing over 500 grams of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The conviction arose from a traffic encounter at a gas station outside Billings, Montana, where Yellowstone County Sheriff’s Sergeant Harrison Gillen pulled his cruiser closely behind Zamora’s parked car. Before Gillen could exit his vehicle, Zamora fled, leading officers on a high-speed chase on snowy and icy roads that included a blind pass of a semi-truck.
Zamora eventually reached a dead end and surrendered. Officers discovered methamphetamine in a hidden compartment of Zamora’s vehicle. Zamora appealed, challenging the denial of two pretrial motions to suppress, the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, and two sentencing determinations: the denial of a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 and the application of a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. He also contested the inclusion of a 2018 Colorado shoplifting conviction in his criminal history calculation.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. First, the court held that no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred at the gas station because, even assuming Sergeant Gillen’s conduct constituted a show of authority, Zamora did not submit to it; instead, he fled. Under California v. Hodari D. and Ninth Circuit precedent, a suspect who flees is not seized until physically apprehended.
By the time Zamora surrendered, officers had reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Second, the court found sufficient evidence to support the conviction, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the government. Third, the district court did not clearly err in denying the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment because Zamora went to trial, contested the offense conduct through sentencing, and submitted a letter that did not mention the offense conduct. Fourth, the reckless-endangerment enhancement was properly applied based on Zamora’s high-speed flight on icy roads and blind pass of a semi-truck. Fifth, any potential error in adding a criminal history point for the 2018 shoplifting conviction was harmless because Zamora’s criminal history score would have remained in Category VI regardless.
Key Takeaways
- A Fourth Amendment seizure by show of authority requires both that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave and that the suspect actually submits to the authority; flight before physical apprehension means no seizure occurred at the initial encounter.
- Evidence discovered after a suspect flees an initial police approach is not subject to suppression as fruit of the poisonous tree if the suspect was not yet seized when the evidence was found.
- A defendant who proceeds to trial and continues to contest offense conduct through sentencing generally cannot receive an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, absent unusual circumstances not present here.
- A two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 is supported by high-speed driving on hazardous roads and dangerous maneuvers such as a blind pass of a large truck.
- A sentencing error in calculating criminal history points is harmless if it does not change the defendant’s Criminal History Category or the resulting Guidelines range.
Why It Matters
This unpublished memorandum disposition reinforces the Ninth Circuit’s application of the Hodari D. framework: a show of authority alone does not constitute a seizure without submission, so evidence obtained after a suspect flees is admissible if probable cause develops during the ensuing pursuit. The decision also illustrates the high bar for obtaining an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction after trial and the fact-specific nature of the reckless-endangerment enhancement. The court’s harmless-error analysis regarding the criminal history calculation demonstrates that not every scoring dispute warrants remand when the Guidelines range is unaffected.
The ruling is case-specific and should be read with its procedural posture and, where applicable, its nonprecedential status in mind. The result is narrowly framed. Practitioners should distinguish the court’s actual disposition from issues it mentioned but expressly left unresolved.