Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Diego Arias Garza, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection and accumulated a criminal history including a May 2021 conviction for possession for purchase/sale of narcotics under California Health and Safety Code § 11351. An immigration judge ordered Garza removed in January or February 2022; he appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in March 2022. ICE re-detained Garza on March 19, 2026. Garza filed a verified habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on April 6, 2026, challenging his detention on Fifth Amendment procedural due process, statutory INA, and Fifth Amendment substantive due process grounds. The district court denied his motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, holding he was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c) based on his conviction and not entitled to a bond hearing under Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). The case was referred to the magistrate judge for findings and recommendations. While briefing was pending, the BIA dismissed Garza’s appeal on May 20, 2026, rendering his removal order final. Garza filed a petition for review in the Ninth Circuit, staying removal.
The operative document is a federal trial-court order. The distinction between a final order and a magistrate judge’s recommendation matters: The magistrate judge recommends denying the habeas petition and entering judgment for the respondent. The recommendation also denies counsel motions without prejudice and recommends denying the government’s request to dismiss the noncustodian respondents; objections are due within 14 days.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge recommends denying the habeas petition. Garza’s removal order became final on May 20, 2026, when the BIA dismissed his appeal, shifting the statutory authority for his detention from 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005), detention for six months after a final removal order is presumptively reasonable. Because less than six months had elapsed since May 20, 2026, Garza’s detention is lawful. His statutory INA claim and substantive due process claim based on indefinite detention therefore fail. The court also rejects Garza’s argument that 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) applies, finding that regulation governs revocation of release for noncitizens already under final orders, whereas Garza was detained before his order became final. The motions for appointment of counsel are denied without prejudice, and respondents’ motion to dismiss non-custodian respondents is denied.
The magistrate judge recommends denying the habeas petition and entering judgment for the respondent. The recommendation also denies counsel motions without prejudice and recommends denying the government’s request to dismiss the noncustodian respondents; objections are due within 14 days.
Key Takeaways
- A noncitizen’s detention authority shifts from § 1226(c) to § 1231(a)(6) once the removal order becomes final upon BIA dismissal of an appeal.
- Detention under § 1231(a)(6) is presumptively reasonable for six months post-final-order; Garza’s detention falls within this window.
- The regulatory revocation procedures in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) do not apply to a noncitizen detained before the removal order became final.
- Non-custodian respondents (e.g., Secretary of DHS, Attorney General) may be properly joined in a habeas petition to permit injunctive relief against future re-detention.
- No absolute right to appointed counsel exists in habeas proceedings; appointment is denied where interests of justice do not require it.
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates the critical distinction between pre-final-order detention under § 1226(c) and post-final-order detention under § 1231(a)(6), and confirms that the Zadvydas six-month presumptive reasonableness period begins when the BIA renders a final administrative decision, not when judicial review concludes. The ruling clarifies that 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i) applies only to revocation of release after a final order, not to initial detention pending finality. It also reaffirms that non-custodian officials may remain as respondents to preserve the court’s ability to enjoin future detention. The findings and recommendations are subject to de novo review by the district judge upon objection.
For practitioners, the immediate lesson is to track both the legal standard and the precise procedural remedy. Deadlines, notice requirements, burdens of proof, and whether relief is recommended or already operative can determine the next filing and the client’s present custody or litigation status.